


118th INFANTRY

A. E. F.




William H.

Oct 1919



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OFFICERS

Left to right, Top Row: Capt. R. T. Brown, Capt. F. M. Mack, Lieut. Col. David Walley, Capt. W. F. Murrah. Bottom Row: Maj. W. L. Gillespie, Lieut. Col. W. F. L. Hartigan, Col. F. K. McCully, Maj. C. C. Wyche, Maj. W. D. Workman.

HISTORY

OF THE

118th INFANTRY

A M E R I C A N
E X P E D I T I O N A R Y
F O R C E , F R A N C E



1919
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MEMORANDUM

Headquarters, 118th Infantry,
American Expeditionary Forces,
France, December 31st, 1918.

Memorandum No. 388.

1. Lieut. Sam J. Royall is hereby detailed on Special Duty as regimental historian.

2. All officers of the regiment are requested to at once make pencil notes of events that should be included in this history and turn them over to Lieut. Royall. Accuracy is important. It is requested that Lieut. Royall be assisted in every way possible so that nothing may delay this work, which should be completed before any breaking up of the regiment occurs.

By Order of Lieut.-Col. Hartigan:

F. M. MACK,
Captain Infantry,
Operations Officer.

HISTORY OF THE REGIMENT

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY TRAINING.

While the achievements of the 118th Infantry are fresh in the minds of those who had the honor to belong to this Regiment, the coming years will dim the memories as to dates, names and places. It is for this reason that we believe a record should be written while these things are foremost in the lives of the men and officers of this Regiment. The writer will not attempt to apologize for the following narrative of events. He was appointed to record them in the shape of a regimental history, not on account of possessing any qualifications for such an undertaking, but simply because some one had to do it and Lieutenant-Colonel Hartigan, with whom the idea originated, happened to select him. So the author asks that you read this with the idea that it is in no manner an attempt to produce a literary masterpiece but merely a narrative showing the impressions we gathered and what the men accomplished when put to the test. While it is an attempt to produce an absolutely accurate account, there are many things of importance that are not recorded here, and no doubt there are many mistakes. Having gathered the information for this work from many sources, this is merely an attempt to consolidate it in a logical manner. Bear with me while I give you a brief outline of our training period in the United States previous to our service in Belgium and France.

The federalization of the National Guard of the various States necessitated a change in the official designations of the Guard units, as, under the new plan of organization, it was necessary to combine the units of several different States, in most instances, to form divisions. Under this new method of organization, the divisions were formed according to the geographical location of the several States that were combined, each unit being given a numerical des-

ignation. It was in this manner that the old First South Carolina Infantry became the 118th Infantry, and, as such, one of the four Infantry regiments of the 30th Division. The 118th and 117th Infantry Regiments and the 114th Machine Gun Battalion formed the 59th Infantry Brigade, commanded during the greater part of its existence by Brigadier-General Lawrence D. Tyson of Tennessee.

Previous to becoming the 118th Infantry, the First South Carolina Infantry had served on the Mexican border, having been called into service on June 19th, 1916, and having been mustered out of service in December of the same year. While the experience gained on the border was of great assistance to those men of the Regiment who served through this period, it was entirely different to the training required for trench warfare. It was what we afterwards termed "peace time warfare," but it did give the Regiment a strong nucleus to work with, when the strength was so greatly increased.

On April 27th, 1917, the Regiment was again called into service, this time being assigned the duty of guarding important property throughout South Carolina. Colonel P. K. McCully of Anderson, S. C., the Commanding Officer, established Regimental Headquarters at Columbia, S. C., while the battalions established headquarters in different cities, sending companies out from these cities. The most important duty performed by the Regiment from the date of its entry into service until the middle of July was the constant guarding of railroad bridges in order that commerce might not be impeded by the destruction of any of them.

About the middle of July the Regiment was assembled at Camp Sevier, near Greenville, S. C., as the pioneer regiment of the 30th Division. The camp at that time consisted mostly of woods, cultivated fields and mud. By the first of November great improvements had been made in the camp, this Regiment having contributed more than its share of work in the cleaning up process. Infantry might have been the official designation of the Regiment, but the men insisted that it should be called the South Carolina Land & Devel-

opment Company, so expert had they become with the use of the pick and shovel.

Under the new plan of organization, the personnel of an infantry regiment had been greatly increased, the new plan calling for a war strength of more than 3,600 men and officers. As this Regiment had a strength of about 1,200 when it reached Camp Sevier, it was necessary to add twice its strength to fill it up to the required standard. The dissolution of the 55th Depot Brigade in October added several hundred men who had belonged to National Guard units from South Carolina, North Carolina and Tennessee. A draft of men from Camp Jackson, S. C., during the same month, brought the strength to around two hundred men per company but even this was not enough, so during the winter another contingent from Camp Dodge, Iowa, was added, bringing the Regiment to full war strength. The Camp Dodge men were mostly from Iowa, Minnesota and the Dakotas, but soon had warmed themselves into the hearts of the Southerners, establishing a friendship between the different sections of the Union that will always be remembered by those concerned.

Having started training when the Regiment first reached Camp Sevier, the drills, hikes, trench work and other forms of amusement continued through many weary long months. Day after day the men struggled through eight hours of work, slowly but steadily progressing toward a standard that would mark them trained soldiers. Specialist schools were established, in which men and officers were taught the use of machine guns, automatic rifles, grenades, the bayonet and all the other modern weapons used by infantry in France. These schools were supervised by French and British officers who selected the men showing special qualifications as their assistants, these assistants, in turn, acting as instructors throughout the Regiment, thus enabling practically every man to become familiar with the use of one or more of these weapons.

On January 1st, 1918, Colonel McCully and Lieutenant-Colonel Spratt were temporarily detached from the Regiment in order that they might take a course in a school in

Texas that had been established for the purpose of instructing officers of high rank in their important duties. During the absence of Colonel McCully, the Regiment was commanded by Colonel H. A. Pattison, an officer of the old regular army. Colonel Pat, as he was called, was a soldier who earned the admiration, respect and loyalty of every officer and man of his command. A stern disciplinarian, he was so absolutely just and fair in all matters that there was never any complaint of his actions. So great was his devotion to duty and ability to see the minutest mistakes, that he inculcated in all a supreme confidence in his ability as a leader to be depended upon under all circumstances. Having completed their courses with credit to themselves, both Colonel McCully and Lieutenant-Colonel Spratt returned to the Regiment in April, to take up the work of preparing us for the great work ahead.

By this time the men could no longer be termed recruits, great changes being apparent in the bearing and conduct of the men, who now looked to be, acted, and were trained soldiers. The long, tedious days spent in work had produced the desired result, although this was never admitted by those high in authority as it seems to be a fundamental principle of all things military to criticize any and everything. In the humble opinion of the author, a little less work and a little more freedom would have accomplished the same result in a less time. He realizes that such an opinion is no doubt contrary to that of all military authorities, but would like to give one or two reasons for making the above statement. At the end of four months of this constant grind, the men grew stale, or, in the slang of a soldier, more than fed up and began to recede instead of continuing to improve. The ultimate object of all this was to inculcate a stern discipline, yet when we were placed in the trenches, a great deal of this discipline was of necessity relaxed. If the Australians had any superiors as fighters, we never came into contact with them, yet the discipline among these famous troops was a joke judging by the system laid down for Americans. The author sincerely believes that a lot of the time spent in this training was an absolute waste of

time insofar as it affected the actual fighting in which we participated.


The winter of 1917-1918 was perhaps the most severe winter of the past forty years in this section of the country. Snow, rain and mud made it all the harder for the men, who were forced to spend the winter in tents, yet the work never ceased, indoor work being substituted when the weather was so severe as to prohibit the regular schedule. Epidemics attacked us, pneumonia, meningitis, measles and mumps all going through the regiment, the first two dreaded diseases taking their deadly toll. Practically every company lost at least two men from these diseases. On account of the crowded condition of the Base Hospital, some of the patients did not receive the proper attention, but, generally speaking, the work of the medical corps is worthy of commendation.

Toward the latter part of April it became apparent that our stay at Camp Sevier was drawing to a close. An advance detachment of officers and non-commissioned officers, under command of Major Mahon, left camp on April 30th, bound for overseas duty. On May 1st, preparations for breaking camp were begun. All leaves were cancelled, drills suspended, and a quarantine was placed on the Regiment. The friends and families of the men visited the camp in great numbers to bid farewell to their boys. While most of the men seemed to realize what was in store for them in the future, still there was such a vast relief in knowing that the period of training was over that there did not seem to be any spirit of sadness on the part of the men.

On May 4th the Regiment entrained, bound for Camp Mills, L. I., reaching this camp after a three days' trip. The Regiment remained there a few days, during which time preparations for the embarkation were completed and the shortage of equipment was filled. On May 10th we ferried over to Hoboken and soon boarded the transports that were there waiting on the Division. The quarters furnished the men were exceedingly crowded and could not be termed first class passage, but the knowledge of existing conditions prevented any complaint on the part of the men.

It was while on these transports that the men first came into close contact with the Englishman's delight, "tay," but this beverage never became very popular with them and could not take the place of coffee.

On the 11th, the convoy set sail, the start being made with as much secrecy as possible. After a trip of twelve days, endangered by the submarine menace, the convoy reached Liverpool, debarking there on the 24th of May. On the same day the Regiment was sent across England, part of it detraining at Dover and the balance at Folkstone. Crossing the English Channel on May 27th, the Regiment landed at Calais, in a few hours, thus reaching France twenty-three days after breaking camp at Sevier.



OBLIQUES YPRES

CHAPTER II.

OPERATIONS IN BELGIUM.

It was hard for us to realize that at last we were in France and less than one hundred miles from the front line. Realization soon came, however, when we saw the damage that had been inflicted by aerial bombs and heard the hum of numerous planes overhead. The port of Calais was one of, if not the largest base, for the British forces, tons of supplies and thousands of troops passing through it daily. Here the regiment remained a few days, checking equipment, resting and acquiring enough knowledge of the French language to show the proprietors of the cafes that we were not very ardent prohibitionists. One of the first things that we learned was the French monetary system, but even now we don't believe that five francs, sixty centimes, was ever equal to a good old American dollar. It is truly remarkable how soon soldiers adapt themselves to new conditions and any environment, regardless of strange languages and customs.

The Regiment left Calais on May 29th, arriving at Chat Cocave, in the Department of Calais, the same day, where it remained until May 31st, when the journey was started that took us a step nearer the scene of activities. After a short trip the Regiment detrained at Audricq, a small town in the Department of Calais, near which the British had established a training area known as the Eperlocques Training Area. On account of the lack of a camp large enough to accommodate the Regiment, the battalions were billeted in little villages, all within a few miles of each other. The First Battalion occupied the billets in the town of Zouffques, the Second, the town of Recques, while Regimental Headquarters, Headquarters Company, and the Third Battalion billeted in Tournehem.

It was while occupying this area that the men first experienced a few of the many discomforts of a war-ridden country. Barns for living quarters, rats and the soldier's pet aversion, the famous cootie, appeared on the scene for

for the first time. This latter pest stuck to the Regiment for many months, during which time it demonstrated its ability as the most rapid multiplier in the animal world. The rats furnished some good sport as targets for everything from a shoe to a rifle, but we did not deem them a necessity.

Within a few days after reaching this area, a regular training schedule was started, most of the training being done by battalions. During this period of training the entire Division was transferred to the 2nd British Army, at that time operating in Belgium in conjunction with the remnant of the Belgian Army. This transfer necessitated a complete change in the system of supplies and transportation, which was brought about by the untiring efforts of Captain Brown, Regimental Supply Officer, and his able assistants. The entire Regiment was furnished British equipment, both ordnance and quartermaster, but retained the American uniforms, packs and an unlimited optimism in the final outcome of the big fuss. As a special dispensation, the American troops were allowed to have coffee instead of tea.

For some time rumors had been floating around to the effect that we were to go to the front to take over a sector from the British. Ever since our arrival in this area, small groups of officers and non-commissioned officers had been visiting the front, where they were given an opportunity to observe trench warfare as practiced by our Allies. Plans had been mapped out for a forced march to the front in case of an emergency, at which time the Regiment was to occupy a part of the line south of Cassel. On July 2nd the Regiment began the march that was to last three days, ending only when it was billeted in the forward area, within range of enemy artillery. The three days' hike into Belgium will linger long in the memories of the men who made it, not so much on account of the fact that we were going under shell fire for the first time, but because of the hardships endured.

At the end of the first day the Regiment pitched camp for the night in an open field near the little town of Rubrouck, after a march of about twelve miles, during which

the men carried extremely heavy packs. On the following morning the march was resumed, halting for the night in the Herzelee area, within a few miles of the Belgian border. On the morning of the fourth of July, the frontier was crossed, this Regiment leading the Division, thus having the honor of being the first American Regiment to enter the little country of wreck and ruin. Passing through the towns of Watou and St. Janister Bienzen, the march to the front was continued. The last several miles of this march was made without a halt, in the formation used by troops on the march under shell fire. While this formation had been often practiced by the Regiment, it was the first time that real shell whistled over the heads of the men. Finally we straggled into Dirty Bucket Camp, where the entire Regiment was billeted, with the exception of the Machine Gun Company, two platoons of Headquarters Company and the Supply Company.

The Regiment remained in Dirty Bucket Camp for about two weeks, during which time we began to get accustomed to the whine of the shell and the hum of the plane. This camp is situated in the famous Ypres Salient, at that time being about four miles behind the front line, the nearest point of which was directly in front of the city of Ypres, or, rather, what had been the city. On the north the line was held by the Belgians, while on the south the British were holding the line in front of Kemmel Hill, it having been taken by the Hun during the spring drive of 1918, after some of the bloodiest fighting of the war. Kemmel, overlooking the surrounding territory for miles, loomed up as a deadly menace, especially to the Salient.

One of the most striking features connected with our occupation of this Salient was the contrast between the morale and spirits of the veteran soldiers of the British and Belgian Armies and that of the green American troops. The latter were full of an enthusiasm and confidence that puzzled the men who had been in the war for a long time and who were looking forward to a big attack with anything but enthusiasm. Ever since the great spring drive of the Germans the British had been expecting another one to

be made on the channel ports, in which event the armies in Belgium would have to bear the brunt of the drive. By the time this Regiment reached the front it was generally believed that the attack would be delivered during July. Perhaps if our men had been veterans and had been through one of these drives they would not have been so full of enthusiasm, but certainly they showed very little concern on account of the rumors. They did not like those that outlined a retreat in case of a drive, as they stated they had not gone to the front to retreat. So certain were the British that the Boche intended making this drive that Colonel McCully was requested to move his headquarters from Dirty Bucket as the British expected to lay down a counter barrage, in which case that particular camp would have been subjected to heavy retaliatory fire. In compliance with this request the famous march from this camp to Oostove Farm was carried out on a dark, gloomy night.

The Regiment was given a sector of the East Poperinghe Trench System, generally known as the "Blue Line," to be occupied in case of the attack. Here the different battalions were assigned their respective portions of the sector, the men going into the trenches and remaining there long enough to familiarize themselves with the sector. The Regimental sector, about two thousand yards in length, joined that of the Belgians on the left and the 117th's on the right. This system was strongly fortified by barbed wire, concrete dugouts and had a well defined field of fire, covering the main road from Poperinghe to Elverdinghe. Emplacements were dug for the auxiliary weapons and plans were worked out for the handling of supplies and ammunition.

Previous to occupying this system, the Regiment had been given a tour of duty in the front line trenches in front of Ypres. The battalions and auxiliary units were sent forward, where they relieved some of the companies of the 49th British Division. The battalions took over in rotation, placing two companies in the front line in cooperation with the remaining British units. Each battalion occupied the forward area for eight days. It was so quiet on this sector

that it was hard to realize that some of the bloodiest battles of the war had been fought there in the past. Such names as Hell Fire Corner, Shrapnel Corner and Menin Gate have become famous throughout the world. It was here that the Canadians made their famous stand against the first gas attack.

On August 16th the entire Regiment was assembled at School Camp, near St. Janister Bienen, where it was held in support while the 60th Brigade took over the front line on what was known as the Canal Sector, from the 33rd British Division. This sector was dominated by Kemmel Hill, making it more dangerous than the one the Regiment had occupied. During the rest of August the Regiment continued to occupy this camp, devoting most of its time to drills and inspections. For amusement the men played baseball, but frequently the games were interrupted by fragments of shells which fell all around the diamond, as the enemy shelled our observation balloons overhead.

On August 8th we were so unfortunate as to temporarily lose Colonel McCully, our Commanding Officer, who had been with the Regiment for many years. He was succeeded by Colonel Orin R. Wolfe. It is probably unwise to criticize the actions of those high in authority, as they are supposed to know what is best, but, in the opinion of those who were forced to serve under Colonel Wolfe, somebody blundered in sending him to us. He may have been a gallant and able soldier, but if the opinion of the men of his command is worth anything, he was a complete failure as a Commanding Officer. His treatment of those under him did not tend to inculcate any spirit of loyalty or love among them but did make him feared and disliked throughout the entire Regiment. Having stated that he would accept no excuses for anything, he lived up to that doctrine on all occasions.

The great Boche drive had failed to materialize, but, on the contrary, fierce fighting was going on further south, thereby relieving the tension under which we had lived ever since arriving in Belgium. Articles published in newspapers since the signing of the armistice stated that evidence had been found showing that the enemy had massed

seventeen divisions behind Kemmel Hill preparatory to launching a big drive on this part of the line but that the counter drives of the Allies had forced him to abandon his plan. So, perhaps, all the work done by this Regiment in Belgium was not in vain, as one of the lessons all soldiers learn from experience is the necessity of preparedness. The British had made elaborate preparations in the Salient, having placed numerous silent batteries all through it. These batteries were so skilfully camouflaged that it was possible to walk within a few feet of them without being able to detect their locations.

In accordance with the custom, details were sent into the front line on the night of August 29th, to make the necessary arrangements for relieving the 119th Infantry on the following night. The Regiment, however, was destined to escape this tour of trench duty, as other plans had been made, of which we were entirely ignorant, in which we were to play a more important part than merely holding a trench system. So, instead of taking over the front line, the Regiment remained in reserve while the 60th Brigade delivered its successful attack on Vormezeele on September 1st. Great was the speculation as to cause for the sudden change of plans but there was no evidence of great disappointment on account of the failure to occupy the line. On September 6th the Regiment marched to Proven, where it entrained at once. Thus our experience in Belgium ended after a stay of two months, during which time we had learned something of actual conditions on the front and had been bitterly disillusioned in more ways than one.

CHAPTER III.

THE HINDENBURG LINE.

Having left Belgium, the Regiment detrained, after a trip of several hours, near Valhoun, in the St. Pol Area, north of Amiens. Here the battalions were distributed throughout some small villages, the First billeting in Bours, the Second in Marest and the Third in Pressey. Headquarters Company and the Machine Gun Company accompanied Regimental Headquarters to Valhoun. This area was some distance behind the lines, the sector in front of it having moved eastward at a rapid rate as a result of the drive of the Third and Fourth British Armies.

A period of training was started immediately, in which various problems of attack and consolidation were practiced. Great stress was placed on the importance of liaison between all units. For the first time we saw the famous tanks at work. It was very evident that the Regiment was being specially trained for some important duty as the maneuvers were not the kind that would have helped in stationary trench warfare. This training soon came to an end, however, and on the morning of September 18th a move toward another part of the front was started. Upon reaching this part of it several days later, it soon became apparent that there were some portions of the front that made others seem like rest camps and the men soon realized that they were up against the real thing this time.

By the night of the 18th the Regiment had pitched camp at Tutencourt, near the ruins of Albert. Here three days were spent in performing the usual duties incident to camp life in France. On the 22nd, the journey was resumed that was to carry us to the front. This part of the trip was made in trucks or lorries, as we had learned to call them from association with the British. Part of the journey carried us through the devastated areas of the old Somme battlefield, where utter ruin prevailed.

It is impossible to conceive of a greater destruction than had been wrought in this area; practically the only objects

seen were ruined villages, abandoned trenches, shell holes and rusty barbed wire.

After a long, tiresome ride through this area the Regiment debussed near the village of Tincourt, during the early morning of September 23rd. Camp was pitched in a wood where advantage was taken of the shelters that had been built by the enemy and abandoned a few days before in his hasty retreat to the main defenses of the Hindenburg Line. About six miles in front of Tincourt, the Australians were steadily driving the Hun before them, having advanced at this time to the outpost lines in front of the town of Bellicourt.

Late in the afternoon of the same day the march into the line was started, this Regiment having been assigned the portion of the line in front of Bellicourt. It was found necessary to halt until darkness would conceal the actual entry into the lines, the march being resumed at dark and the actual work of "taking over" starting about eight o'clock. While there was considerable artillery action during this march, the Regiment was very fortunate as it did not suffer many casualties. One thing experience had taught us was that the actual entry into the line usually resulted in a good many casualties as the roads were heavily shelled at all times.

The sector was between 3,500 and 4,000 yards in length, facing Bellicourt and the St. Quentin Canal and Tunnel. The line was being held by the 2nd and 3rd Brigades of the 1st Australian Division. These brigades had suffered such heavy casualties during their occupancy of this sector that it was possible for a single company of this Regiment to relieve an entire battalion of Australians. The relief was made under great difficulties, especially due to the continuous and heavy shell fire of the enemy. During this operation we sustained the first casualties of importance since entering France. Among those killed at this time was Captain Jones of L Company, who was the first officer of the Regiment killed in action.

The 1st Battalion, under command of Major Mahon, was assigned the left half of the sector, while the 3rd Battalion,

Major Howell commanding, took up its position in the right half. The 2nd Battalion, under command of Captain McFadden, moved up in close support to the other two. On the left of the Regimental sector the line was held by the 27th American Division; on the right by a British Division. The success with which the operation of relief was carried out was due to the co-operation and assistance of the Australians whom we relieved.

The writer would like to digress here long enough to attempt to pay a tribute to the Australians, but their work throughout the entire war is so well known that it would be useless. He would like, however, to mention the warm friendship that existed from the first meeting between these Anzacs and the men of our Regiment. These veterans from a distant continent seemed to take pleasure in affording us every possible assistance, both their officers and men giving us the benefit of their valuable experiences gained during years of constant fighting. While we came into contact with troops from all over the world during our experiences in Europe, there is no doubt that we entertained a warmer feeling of friendship and admiration for the Australians than those of any other nation. Certainly they were more like us than any other troops with the possible exception of the Canadians, with whom we never were brigaded.

Having completed the relief, Regimental Headquarters was established at Hickson's Quarry on the 24th. Headquarters Company having reported here, split up into its various specialties, the Signal Platoon taking charge of the various signal stations while the Stokes Mortar Platoon placed five mortars in the line. The personnel of the One Pound Cannon and Pioneer Platoons suffered such severe losses from a gas attack that it was not possible for them to accomplish any results with the remnants that survived. The Quarry was subjected to intense shell fire, including a continuous use of gas shells that made it an extremely unhealthy spot. On the night of the 24th, the Machine Gun Company relieved the Australian machine gun units in the line, thus completing the relief, leaving the 118th in sole possession of a front line sector for the first time in the history of the Regiment.

Most of the time between the night of the 23rd and the morning of the 25th was spent in improving the shelter and strengthening the defenses. This work was done under difficulties as the enemy kept up an harrassing fire from both artillery and machine guns. Considering the intensity and severity of this fire, our losses were not very excessive during that time. From the effectiveness of the Hun artillery it was evident that this locality was very familiar to his gunners. This constant activity, however, did not seem to have much effect on the morale of the men, who carried out their duties as if this was no new proceeding to them. Carrying parties performed their duties with credit and the rations were received promptly as a general rule. As some of the officers were absent attending schools of instruction, it was necessary to use non-commissioned officers as platoon leaders. As was the case during most of the fighting, these men showed themselves amply qualified to handle any situation.

On the morning of the 25th, the enemy became even more active, delivering several attacks of a local nature. An attack on K Company was repulsed through the efficient aid of the Australian artillery supporting the Regiment. It was impossible to determine the nature or magnitude of this attack, but it was generally believed to have been an attempt to push out an outpost line of machine guns. Whatever the object might have been, the result of the attack was a complete failure as K Company held to its ground. During the attack this company lost three men killed and seventeen wounded but had the satisfaction of knowing that the enemy had suffered greater losses besides failing in his attempt. The rest of the day was comparatively quiet, although machine guns could be heard popping off on all sides and the artillery of both sides made things lively.

On this date the Regiment suffered a severe loss when Major Mahon was severely wounded by shell fragments. As Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion he had served with great honor and distinction. During his long and faithful service in the Regiment he had earned the love and respect of officers and men who had served under him.

It is indeed a pleasure to hear that his wounds have healed to such an extent that he is out of danger. Upon his evacuation, command of the Battalion passed to Captain Ligon of B Company, another officer who had served in the Regiment for many years and who was afterwards awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for gallantry in action.

Faced by the so-called impregnable Hindenburg Line, the 30th Division was to make an attack upon it and the duty of straightening the line preparatory to the attack fell to the lot of the 118th. It was necessary to make an attack in order to advance the line several hundred yards on a frontage of twelve hundred yards. This was a necessary action of importance, as the success of the future attack of the Division depended upon the straightening of this part of the line. In order that the reader may get an idea of the strength of the enemy position in front of this sector, the following extracts from authoritative sources may be of interest.

The official report of the operations of the 30th Division gives the following description of the enemy's position:

"The position occupied by the enemy in front of the 30th Division was not only one of great strength but possessed many unique features. Begun in 1914 and improved further in more recent periods, it formed one of the strongest positions of the famous Hindenburg System. In addition to the several heavy belts of wire and a very complete trench system, skilful advantage had been taken of the great natural obstacle of the St. Quentin Canal, to make this position as nearly impregnable as was humanly possible. In addition to the canal and tunnel this portion of the line included a system of trenches, generally three interlocked by communication and approach trenches placed at frequent intervals. Wide belts of strong German wire protected the entire system. Forward belts were frequently in the form of deep triangles 50 to 150 yards in depth. It is believed that there are few positions as well adapted for machine gun defense as the sector just described."

The report of the 105th Engineers who surveyed this line at a later date contains the following statements:

"Strongly built barbed wire entanglements of the double apron type had been erected in connection with the trench system. This wiring had well withstood the powerful artillery fire directed against it. A total of twenty-seven observation posts are about evenly distributed along this line."

In compliance with orders, the 1st and 3rd Battalions delivered the attack on the night of September 26th, supported by the Machine Gun Company. The attack was a frontal one, thus exposing the Battalions to machine gun fire from concealed outposts. After an intense artillery barrage lasting ten minutes the Battalions moved forward for a distance of five hundred yards on a twelve hundred yard front. This operation, the first of its kind ever undertaken by the Regiment, terminated in a complete success. Within less than two hours, the 3rd Battalion reported all objectives taken and the line consolidated. The 1st Battalion, on the left, however, experienced more difficulty on account of an enfilading machine gun fire from the left, D Company in particular suffering heavily. In spite of the strong opposition, this Battalion gained and held its objectives. It is to this attack we refer when we say that the 118th Infantry was the first American regiment to make an attack against the Hindenburg Line. The Regiment does not claim the honor of having broken through the main system of defense, but it does claim to have been the first Regiment to deliver a successful attack against the outpost line of the Hindenburg System.

On the morning of the 27th D Company was ordered to attack in conjunction with the 27th American Division on its left, in order that the entire Corps front might be straightened. After an advance by this company to Malakoff Woods it was necessary to fall back a short distance on account of the failure of the 27th Division to advance. During the day several attacks were made on this Company, all of which were repulsed by the use of grenades and automatic rifles. While leading his platoon in repelling one of these attacks, Lieutenant Frampton was killed, receiving several wounds in his chest from machine gun bul-

lets. B Company was also subjected to several attacks but successfully repulsed them. It was found necessary to reinforce these companies on account of an exposed flank, Companies E and F being ordered up to perform this duty. The 3rd Battalion on the right had been experiencing hard fighting all during the day but had been able to hold all of its objectives.

The 60th Brigade relieved this Regiment in the front line during the night of the 27th, completing the relief about 2 a. m., the 28th. As soon as the relief was completed the entire Regiment moved back to Roisel, where the day was spent in reorganization and a checking up of the losses in men and equipment. The continued occupancy for four days and five nights of the front line had naturally occasioned heavy casualties, the 1st Battalion having suffered the greatest losses on account of the exposed left flank. The behavior of the men in the face of the veteran troops of the enemy had been all that could have been expected of them. As some writer has said in referring to the Hindenburg Line: "To the Germans it means security, a sure defense, an opportunity to prepare for new offensives." It is therefore with pride that the 118th Infantry claims the honor of having been the first American Regiment to face the Hun in his position of security and to the fact that this Regiment not only repulsed all attacks delivered against it, but made a substantial advance in the face of machine gun opposition from this so-called impregnable system.

The activities of the Regiment, however, did not cease with the relief as the Regiment was placed in Divisional reserve, which meant that it was to be held in readiness for any emergency that might arise. On the morning of the 29th, when the 30th and 27th Divisions of the American Army and units of the British Army delivered the never to be forgotten attack on the main system of the Hindenburg Line, this Regiment, resting from its labors of the preceding week, was called upon to furnish men as stretcher bearers and to assist in handling prisoners and captured material.

The result of the attack of the 30th Division on the 29th of September is too well known to be dwelt on at length in

this record. The attack, begun at dawn, did not end until all objectives had been taken and resulted in the capture of a large number of prisoners and material. The feat of the two American Divisions, the 30th and 27th, will ever live as one of the greatest achievements of American troops. The official correspondent of the Australian forces in France, in describing the Americans' assault, praises the troops in the following words:

"Some day, when the full story of this battle can be told, the American people will thrill with pride in these magnificent troops upon whom a tremendous task fell. They were faced by the most formidable task that could be imposed upon them, the breaking of two double systems of the greatest defense line the Germans ever constructed. On the left of their attack there was some uncertainty regarding the situation and this increased the difficulty of their work; yet these troops, working under the enthusiasm of their high ideal, carried through their assaults, penetrated deeper even than had been intended, and delivered a blow which attracted the greatest part of the enemy's resistance. Beyond all question, they made it possible to break the defensive line in a position of the utmost importance to the Allied cause."

On the night of the 29th, the 2nd Battalion was ordered up to reinforce and protect the flank of the 119th Infantry, then occupying the LaCatelet-Nauroy Line. The march into the lines was made under great difficulties, heavy rain, darkness and concentrated shell fire making it a fearful task. The guide was unable to lead the Battalion to the correct position, necessitating a long halt in the rain. Finally, matters were straightened out and the Battalion took up a position on the flank of the 119th Infantry, where it remained until the Division was relieved. On the morning of the 30th F Company took part in an offensive delivered by the Australians who had "leap frogged" through the Division. This attack was a success, F Company advancing about 800 yards in an easterly direction. The Machine Gun Company, having been ordered forward on the night of the 29th, reported to the Commanding

General of the 60th Brigade, who held this company at Brigade Headquarters in Brigade reserve, there being no need of additional machine gun units in the front line.

The following extracts from the official report of General Tyson, Commanding General of the 59th Brigade, summarizes the part played by the 118th Infantry in the operations against the Hindenburg Line:

"On Monday night, September 23rd, the 118th Infantry was directed to take over the frontage held by the Australian Division, which, as stated above, amounted to 3,500 to 4,000 yards. This was done, and this Regiment manned the trenches and held the front line from Monday night to the night of the 27th-28th. The 60th Brigade relieved the 118th on Friday night, about 3:30 a. m., the 27th and 28th of September, and took charge of the front line. The 118th Infantry was then placed as Divisional reserve. The 118th Infantry had done excellent work in the line during the four days it was holding the line, in which time it had to withstand shell fire and raids from the enemy which it successfully resisted, and had been called upon to take a certain amount of ground in order to straighten out the line, and this had been successfully done, and that, too, after the left flank of the 118th Infantry had been exposed for something like 1,000 yards by reason of the repulse of the 27th Division in its effort to take the ground to the left of the 118th. This Regiment suffered a great many casualties in both officers and men during these four days in which it held the trenches."

After describing the attack of the morning of the 29th, the report continues as follows: "The 2nd Battalion of the 118th Infantry was directed to reinforce the 119th Infantry also on the same afternoon and evening, and it went into the line and manned the trenches in the LaCatelet-Nauroy system of trenches during the night of the 29th of September and suffered a number of casualties and aided materially in holding and defending the line from German attack. I think the officers and men of the 59th Brigade deserve the highest degree of credit and commendation for the very important and meritorious part they took in

this great battle and in the preparations leading up to it and subsequently in the holding of the line."

The Regiment remained near Hargicourt as Divisional reserve until the morning of October 2nd, the 2nd Battalion having moved back to the Quarry Ravine after its relief in the front line. The men took advantage of the opportunity afforded to examine the famous St. Quentin Tunnel and Canal, captured by the Division on the morning of the 29th of September. This tunnel was constructed by Napoleon Bonaparte, having been completed in 1810 after eight years of work. It was during an examination of the tunnel that the discovery was made of what most of us believed to be a melting pot in which the Germans boiled the dead soldiers. This belief was sustained by the fact that a human head was found in one of the pots, as appears from the official report of the survey party of the 105th Engineers, here copied in part. The Intelligence Department, however, after an examination, reported that a shell had exploded in the room, killing the Germans and throwing the head of one in the pot. The report of the Engineers contains the following in reference to this establishment, whatever its nature:

"On entering the room, two pairs of what appeared to be ordinary wagon wheels, set about ten feet apart, were found. Connecting the axles of the two pairs of wheels were two long poles; swung between the poles was ordinary chicken or rabbit wire. At the farther end of this cradle were several iron pots set flush to the top brick masonry, and the tops about three feet above the floor. There were flues under the pots for fires. There were six dead Germans piled beside the pots and one of the pots contained a German's head floating in some liquid. The German had short clipped red hair. The next pot was filled with liquid and two cans containing what appeared to be dirty white grease (though not as solid as lard) stood beside the pot. The room was almost in complete darkness, the light entering through a small hole in the ceiling of the room. We did not examine the room in detail but we did hold a candle within a few inches of the German's head in the pot and rumbled his hair with a stick."

Having performed all of the duties assigned it, the Regiment moved back about ten miles to LeMesnil, near Perrone, on October 2nd. The strenuous service gone through with in the preceding ten days necessitated a rest and a reorganization. During the tour of duty in the front line the casualties had been severe, the strain terrific, and there was no doubt in the minds of all of us that we had earned a good, long rest. Whatever hopes we may have entertained were short-lived, however, as October 5th found us again on the move to the front, after being out of the lines three days.

While every man in the Regiment is justly proud of the record it made in September, it is to the October operations that we can always refer to as the supreme achievements of what we believe to have been the best infantry Regiment in the American Expeditionary Forces. It was during October that the men and officers stood the test of semi-open warfare with an endurance and courage that gave them the right to class the regiment as one of the best fighting units in the American Army. So the author will leave the subject of the operations against the Hindenburg Line to take up what we will call the October fighting.

CHAPTER IV.

OCTOBER OPERATIONS.

On October 5th, the Regiment moved by lorries from LeMesnil to Templeaux, a distance of about thirty miles, allowing for the round about way in which the trip was made. Halting here, dinner was eaten, and after a short rest the march was started, the first halt being made after several miles had been covered. Having halted to wait for darkness, advantage was taken of the shelter afforded by the trenches southwest of Nauroy. As soon as darkness set in, the march was resumed, the entire Regiment taking up a column of file along the road. Since the relief of the 30th Division, five days before, the Australians had made an advance of several miles, driving the enemy with such rapidity that they had not been able to remove the dead. On this march the road was congested by artillery and supplies moving up. The road was subjected to very effective artillery fire and bombing from overhead planes, resulting in numerous casualties to the Regiment; Headquarters Company in particular suffering to such an extent that not a single platoon entered the lines with over half of the original strength.

Arriving at Australian Brigade Headquarters, the different battalions separated and were guided into the lines. Regimental Headquarters was established in a deep dugout near the town of Joncourt. Relieving the 21st and 22nd Infantry Battalions and the 2nd Pioneer Battalion of the 6th Brigade, Australian Division, this Regiment again found itself in sole possession of a front line sector. The line at this time formed a sharp salient around the outskirts of the town of Montbrehain. So deep was this salient that the Hun fired on us from east, south and north, thus making it one of the most unhealthy positions imaginable. In addition to the shell fire, there existed the strong probability of a counter attack from any or all three directions. Sharp fighting had been in progress all the afternoon of the 5th. On account of the failure of a British

Division on the right to advance, it was necessary to form a defensive flank, increasing the normal frontage to a total frontage of over 6,000 yards.

Upon the arrival in the line it was learned that the advance party, which had left Le Mesnil on the morning of the 5th, had met with misfortune before reaching the line. A shell exploded directly under the lorry carrying the party, fatally wounding Lieutenant Earl of M Company and wounding Major Howell, Lieutenants Ruhl, Anderson, Howard and D. T. Smith. Lieutenant G. F. Read, another member of the advance party, had reached the lines, but had been killed in the afternoon while reconnoitering the line. Upon the evacuation of Major Howell, command of the 3rd Battalion passed to Captain Gillespie of I Company, who was later promoted for his gallant and efficient service in action. It is a fact worth mentioning that none of the Battalions were commanded by majors during the October fighting, Captains Ligon, McFadden and Gillespie commanding the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions, respectively.

During the remainder of the night of the 5th and the 6th, the line remained stationary, the men spending a great deal of the time in strengthening the defenses. As the line had been established as late as the 5th, by the Australians, it could not be called a well defined trench system. Lieutenant R. E. Farmer of K Company was killed in the front line on the 6th. The enemy fired a great many gas shells during this time, inflicting numerous casualties. First aid posts were established in Swiss Cottage near Regimental Headquarters. On the night of October 6th, this Regiment was occupying a part of the sector, about 1,000 yards in advance of that held by the 117th on the left and considerably in advance of that held by the Buffs of the British Army on the right. This, of course, made the position one of extreme danger in that the sector was not only exposed to fire from three directions but was confronted with the probability of a counter attack.

In co-operation with the 117th Infantry, this Regiment attacked on the morning of the 7th for the purpose of straightening and shortening the line. The attack was

preceded by a creeping barrage from the artillery and resulted in an advance of 1,100 yards on a seven hundred yard front. At the completion of this attack, the line held by the 118th joined that of the 117th's on the left. Two companies of the 2nd Battalion were ordered to go to the assistance of the 117th, the report stating that the enemy had counter attacked on the 117th. Companies G and H were sent out to render the necessary assistance, but learned that the report was untrue and returned to their respective positions in the line. During this movement, however, Company H was caught in a heavy shell fire, suffering severe casualties, including eight killed. On the night of the 7th, the British took over a part of the line on the extreme right that was being held by L Company.

In accordance with instructions from the 2nd Corps, a formal attack by the Division was ordered for the morning of the 8th. At a conference of most of the officers held in Regimental Headquarters, plans were worked out and each unit was assigned its duties for the next morning. The Regiment was again handicapped by the absence of several officers who had been sent to attend another school, having left the Regiment on the 3rd or 4th. Just before daylight on the morning of the 8th, the Machine Gun Company and the Stokes Mortar Platoon of Headquarters Company were ordered to split up and report to Battalion Headquarters of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions.

At ten minutes past five, just as dawn was breaking, the artillery laid down a heavy barrage and the men started over the top, following the tanks, that had come up just in time to take their places in the line. It was an ideal day for fighting, neither too hot nor too cold, and as the mist soon cleared the men were able to keep in contact with each other. The left battalion, the 2nd, made steady progress towards its objective, which was some distance northeast of the town of Brancourt. The 3rd Battalion on the right, however, met with fierce opposition from the very beginning. Having reached the outskirts of Brancourt, this opposition increased, but with the assistance of C Company and the Machine Gun Company, the Battalion succeeded

in driving the enemy out of the village and passed through it. This was done after numerous machine gun nests in the town had been taken by bold assaults and after considerable fighting from house to house. One company of the First Battalion was used to mop up the town. The First Battalion having followed the other two in close support, passed through them after they had gained their objectives and advanced to what was called the contingent objective, where it dug in for the time being. This objective was at a distance of at least 5,000 yards from the starting point. It was less than six hours before that the first shells were fired in the barrage, yet in that time the infantry had advanced about three miles.

During the attack the enemy had been using artillery and machine guns with telling effect. The artillery supporting us had followed the advance with great rapidity, but, on account of faulty liaison, it was not always possible to use the guns as the exact position of the infantry was not known. By noon all objectives had been gained and the Regiment dug in for the rest of the day. The new line held by it was about two thousand yards east of Brancourt. So rapid was the advance that the enemy did not have time to remove all of his light artillery, resulting in the capture by this Regiment of quite a few batteries as well as numerous machine guns. During the operation the Regiment recaptured six square miles of territory that had been in the possession of the enemy for over four years.

During the afternoon the British used cavalry in an attempt to break through the line held by the enemy. No more spectacular sight can be imagined than a cavalry charge in the face of machine gun and artillery fire. Both on our left and right, we could see troops rush out of some wood and sweep up the side of a hill, in a perfect line.

Time and again these charges would be made, but if the main purpose was to break through the line, then the operations could not be termed a success. On the right frequent charges were made on a nest of machine guns in a patch of woods. In this operation the cavalry was successful, as the enemy was driven from the woods. Several direct hits

were registered on this latter troop by enemy artillery, but this did not stop the attack. Later in the day the enemy returned to the woods, making it necessary for the infantry to take it again.

During the fighting of the morning the Regiment had suffered very severe casualties. Company I had met with fierce resistance from the very beginning of the attack, suffering many casualties, losing, among others, Lieutenant W. A. Mulloy, who was killed early in the morning. Lieutenant T. H. Smith was also killed while acting as Regimental liaison officer, and later in the day Lieutenant W. A. Hudgens, Adjutant of the 3rd Battalion, and Lieutenant W. C. Stevenson of A Company were killed. In addition to those killed, several officers were wounded severely. A battalion of the 120th Infantry that had been sent forward to reinforce the 118th was caught in a barrage on the edge of Brancourt and suffered very heavily, one platoon losing practically every man in it.

The capture of Brancourt resulted in the liberation of the few remaining civilians, who had lived there during the four years of German occupation. It is impossible to describe the amazement and joy of these poor people when they realized that the enemy had been driven from the village. No more pathetic scene can be imagined than that enacted by them when they crawled out of their cellars to find that the Hun rule was a thing of the past. It was here that we first saw evidence of the barbarous treatment by the Hun of those who had been forced to live under the iron rule.

In summing up the operation of the first day it can be said that it was a glorious victory for this Regiment in every sense of the word. The idea that the American soldier did not have a superior in open warfare had been proved. The line had been advanced to the contingent objective, a distance of over five thousand yards, 766 prisoners captured, including 16 officers, a village taken and a vast amount of material captured. It has not been possible to obtain an accurate account of the amount of material captured, as the advance was so rapid that no check was possi-

ble at the time. The dreaded price had been paid in the severe losses sustained, but the great ultimate object, success in battle, had been attained. In speaking of this success, due credit should be given to the British artillery supporting the Regiment, as well as the tanks manned by Americans that assisted in the operation.

Late during the night of the 8th, orders were received for another attack on the morning of the 9th. These orders were so late in reaching the respective battalion commanders that very little time was given in which to work out the details with the company officers. In commenting upon this the report of General Lewis, Division Commander, contains the following sentence: "That the 59th Brigade attacked the next morning at the proper time and in the proper formation reflects great credit upon all commanding officers concerned." The night of the 8th passed without any attempt on the part of the enemy to counter attack. His planes were very active, dropping a great many bombs in the towns of Montbrehain and Brancourt and on the road between these towns.

At 5:20, the morning of the 9th, the Regiment again jumped off, supported by an artillery barrage that was not as effective or strong as the one of the preceding morning. The plan of attack placed the 1st Battalion in front, the 2nd in support and the 3rd in reserve. The 1st Battalion reached its objectives early after having overcome severe resistance, especially from machine gun nests concealed in thick woods, which were taken by a bold frontal attack. Having halted upon its objective, the 1st Battalion rested here while the 2nd passed through it and advanced to its objective, about a thousand yards in advance. This position was the Regimental objective for the day, the 120th passing through at this position and moving forward to its objective on the eastern outskirts of the town of Becquigny, a distance of about 2,000 yards from the line held by the 118th Infantry.

During this advance the resistance of the enemy was not as strong as that of the previous morning. Apparently, he was fighting a rear guard action, using numerous machine

guns as his main weapon of defense. The English, on the right, had not advanced as rapidly as this Regiment, thereby leaving an exposed flank to be protected. The large town of Bohain, on the right, was still in possession of the enemy, so it became necessary to throw out a protective line to prevent an attack from that direction. This duty was performed by the 2nd Battalion, supported by the Machine Gun Company, the latter company having been rushed to the support of G Company. Having been the first company to reach the main road running from Bohain to Busigny, G Company had experienced the novel sensation of picking off a few Boche who were endeavoring to escape on bicycles. The 2nd Battalion captured 300 bicycles during the day.

Al along the line the advance had been rapid and steady. Opposition was encountered from machine guns concealed in woods, and snipers had been active, but in every instance this opposition had been overcome by the men, who refused to let anything hold them up. An examination of some of these machine gun nests proved to be interesting, as they showed what masters of this weapon the Germans had become. Having consolidated the line, the men dug in for the night on the objective. About 200 prisoners had been captured and over five square miles of territory retaken. As the 60th Brigade had passed through the 59th Brigade, during the day, this Regiment, as well as the 117th, reverted to Divisional reserve. The afternoon passed in comparative quietness, which was a great blessing for the men, as they were worn out by the strain of the two days' fighting. Some difficulty had been experienced in getting up the rations to the various companies, but this was soon remedied. As on the preceding day, the advance had proved a success in every sense of the word. The casualties had not been as severe nor the fighting as intense, but the strain had been just as severe on the men. The advance had carried the Regiment forward for a distance of 4,100 yards, making a total advance for the two days of over nine thousand yards.

On the night of the 9th orders were received stating that the Regiment would march to the point of assembly and

rest. If these orders meant that we were to rest, then somebody changed their mind, as the 10th found us still advancing. Orders were received making the 118th Divisional reserve, with instructions to follow the 120th Infantry support battalion at 1,000 yards. These orders did not reach Regimental Headquarters until late and as they had to be communicated to the respective battalions, it was consequently several hours after daylight before the movement was well underway. As an instance of the wonderful efficiency of the Regiment can be noted the fact that within less than one hour after receiving the orders the men were on the march. The order of this march was 3rd Battalion in the lead, 2nd Battalion in support and the 1st following.

During this advance the 1st Battalion was caught in a barrage while marching up a hill on the southern outskirts of the town of Becquigny, suffering severe casualties. This hill must have been under direct observation by the enemy, as a regular barrage was laid down just as soon as the Battalion started up it. At this time the location of the front line was not definitely known by the Battalion commanders. The advance of the 120th Infantry had been brought to a stop before that regiment was able to reach its objective. On account of the severity of the fire directed against it, that Regiment found that it could not advance and was compelled to dig in for protection. In the meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion had established Headquarters in the northern part of the same village and the men had dug in along the railroad embankment for the night.

The British, on the right of the 120th Infantry, had not been able to advance either. This left a gap between that had to be protected, so the 118th was again called upon to perform this duty. The 1st Battalion and one company of the 3rd Battalion took up their positions on the right of the 120th, establishing a series of connecting posts. The remaining three companies of the 3rd Battalion and the 2nd Battalion remained in support. The Machine Gun Company split up, two platoons having gone forward with the 1st Battalion, while the other platoon operated with the 2nd Battalion. The rest of the night passed in com-

parative quietness. The spoils of war captured by this Regiment on the 10th did not amount to anything worthy of record. Until five companies were sent into the line to connect the British and the 120th, the main duty of the Regiment had been to follow the advance at a distance of 1,000 yards. The night of the 3rd marked the end of three days' continuous advancement on the part of this Regiment, but, even then, there was no evidence of a relief for it.

Orders were received during the night of the 10th, placing the 118th under orders of the Commanding General of the 60th Brigade. The 120th Infantry had suffered such severe losses during the two preceding days that it was deemed inadvisable to send it forward again the next morning. So the 118th was ordered forward to take its place in the attack to be delivered the next morning. The orders were late in reaching the Regiment.

At 5:30 a. m., October 11th, the 60th Brigade attacked, with the 118th on the right and the 119th on the left. A very limited barrage supported the attack. The advance of the previous three days had been so rapid that it had not been possible for the artillery to follow it closely. Horses had dropped dead endeavoring to keep up, and the supply of ammunition had run low. As the line of the 118th was behind that of the 119th, the two regiments did not start the attack simultaneously, the latter regiment being ordered to wait until the advance of the 118th had brought it up on the same line. Some of the units did not get away promptly at zero hour on account of the orders having reached them at such a late hour. The barrage was put down on a line in advance of the 118th, holding up after twenty minutes in order to allow the infantry to catch up.

With the LaSelle River and the high ground beyond it as the objectives, the Regiment attacked, the 1st Battalion in the center, with the 2nd on the left and the 3rd on the right. The 1st Battalion of the 120th Infantry acted as Regimental reserve. On the left of the Regimental sector the advance was steady. The village of LaHaie Menneresse was taken after an engagement in the town. On the extreme left the advance carried the line to the LaSelle River.

the frontage along this river amounting to 1,000 yards. The center and right of the Regiment met with very severe opposition from the beginning. Vaux Andigny was taken after hard fighting and on the extreme right a nest of machine guns was taken by a bold assault. The same unconquerable spirit of the past three days carried the men through Vaux Andigny, but fire from machine gun and artillery took an awful toll. Having passed through the village, it was found that a further advance was impossible. The center and right of the Regiment here met with a resistance stronger than had ever been encountered before. The enemy had taken advantage of the preceding day to make his preparations for a stand on the high ground. Faced by the river and the high ground, upon which the enemy had a well defined trench system alive with machine guns, it would have been nothing short of suicide to try to advance without artillery support. The location of the terrain favored the enemy, as he was well secured on the side of a hill, while this Regiment would have been compelled to advance in the open against numerous machine guns. So the line was established short of the original objective for the first time in the fighting.

It was a case of the rifle against machine guns, light artillery and trench mortars. The auxiliary arms of the Regiment could not render any support worth mentioning. Call after call was sent back for artillery action, but none was forthcoming. All day long the men remained in their positions, attempting to discover from where the fire was coming. The 115th Machine Gun Battalion was ordered forward to reinforce the 118th Infantry, sending two companies to the 2nd Battalion and two to the 1st Battalion. These companies did not arrive until late in the afternoon and as six of their guns had been knocked out before reaching the line, were not able to render very much assistance.

Orders were received from General Faison, Commanding 60th Brigade, stating that no companies would cross the river until directed to do so by him. It was easy to see that neither the British on the right or the 3rd Battalion of this Regiment could possibly reach the river in the face

of the opposition from the high ground. Orders were then issued to keep the line on this side of the river until artillery support could be brought up. Had the Regiment been able to secure this support or tanks the advance would have probably gone forward until the objective was reached.

An incident happened here that the author deems worthy of mention. The Regiment had suffered such severe losses that it could not afford to spare a single man, yet orders were received during the hottest part of the fighting, ordering each battalion to send back a number of non-commissioned officers to attend an officers' training camp. These men were sent to a school where they were taught by instructors, most of whom had never commanded troops in the front line, how to do squads right and to salute. As a fitting reward for their service and the work they did in this school, they were returned to the Regiment after the armistice, with the same rank held when they left it.

On the night of the 11th arrangements were made for the relief of the Regiment, the relief being completed before daylight the morning of the 12th. The relief was made by the 107th Regiment of the 27th Division. Just previous to this relief Lieutenant Henry J. Brown of I Company was killed, making a total of ten officers killed since September 25th.

Having marched out of the lines, the Regiment camped in an area about 2,000 yards west of the Bohain-Busigny Road. All day, the 12th, the men stretched out on the ground, trying to relax their tired bodies and to make up some of the sleep that had been lost during the fighting. The 13th was spent in the same position, but on the 14th the Regiment moved into Bohain, a large town that had been captured by the British in the recent fighting, after a patrol from the 118th had entered the town and found that the enemy had evacuated it. The move into Bohain proved to be unfortunate, as the town was being heavily shelled, while our entrance seemed to bring additional fire. Captain Pyles, Regimental Adjutant, and Lieutenant M. W. Jones of Headquarters Company were both killed by shell fire in this town, while Captain R. W. Hudgens was seriously


injured, receiving nineteen wounds. As the intensity of the shell fire increased, the Regiment was assembled and marched back to the same position it had occupied since the morning of the 12th. Here the Regiment remained until the night of the 15th, when it again went into the line, relieving the 107th Infantry on part of the line held by that Regiment. A report from the different battalions on the morning of the 14th showed the total strength to be between fourteen and fifteen hundred men, or less than fifty per cent. of full strength.


Having taken over a part of the line in the same position that it had been when the Regiment turned it over to the 107th Infantry, preparations were made for still another attack. Having failed to receive proper artillery support, the 107th had not attempted to advance the line during the four days previous. The sector taken over by the 118th extended from a point northeast of Vaux Andigny to a point northeast of Le Haie Menneresse, a distance of about fifteen hundred yards. On the right, the line was held by the 117th Infantry, and on the left, by the 105th Infantry. The 3rd Battalion composed the attacking force, followed at 800 yards by the 2nd Battalion in close support, with two companies of the 1st Battalion in reserve. The remaining two companies of the 1st Battalion were used as Brigade support. As an objective the Regiment was called upon to take the high ground east of L'Arbe DeGuise and Ribeaupville.

The attack was delivered at 5:20 a. m., in a dense fog that caused some confusion in the beginning, as it was impossible for all units to keep the correct direction. Part of the 3rd Battalion moved too far to the right and entered the village of Molain, taking this town and turning it over to the 117th. Proper direction was soon recovered and as the fog cleared the line moved forward. The LaSelle River was crossed in numerous places, generally without much difficulty, as there was very little water in the stream. The usual strong opposition had been encountered from the beginning but was partly overcome by the barrage and the use of tanks. On account of the density of the fog, how-


ever, it was impossible for the infantry to keep in touch with the tanks, and within a short time the men were fighting, as they had been for the past several days, on their own. Once again the 118th Infantry was confronted with the task of cleaning out towns and machine gun nests with automatic rifles, grenades and rifles. The Machine Gun Battalions had assisted in the barrage at the beginning of the attack but had been of no further use in the advance, as it was not possible to see any objects upon which machine gun fire could be concentrated. The Regimental Machine Gun Company had suffered such severe losses at the very beginning of the attack that the remnant of this Company was organized as one platoon and held at 2nd Battalion Headquarters.

Having advanced to within five hundred yards of the final objective for the day, having taken the town of St. Martin Rivere, the attacking line of the Regiment was held up by machine gun and artillery fire of great intensity. It was necessary to fall back a short distance where some protection could be gained by a sunken road south of L'Arbee DeGuise. The enemy was firing his artillery over open sights directly in front, making a further advance impossible as the barrage had stopped and there were not enough tanks to destroy the machine gun nests. The 2nd Battalion advanced beyond the village of L'Arbre Guernon but was held up by heavy fire and compelled to fall back 400 yards, where it remained behind a hedge while the 3rd Battalion moved into an advanced position. The fighting had been very severe all day and while the objective had not been reached, the advance had been to a depth of over 4,000 yards on a front of 1,000 yards. When the nature of the opposition and the terrain are considered, the advance was a wonderful feat on the part of this Regiment. The barrage of the enemy had been unusually heavy, having inflicted severe casualties throughout the Regiment at the beginning of the attack. Neither the 117th, on the right, or the 105th, on the left, had been able to make an advance beyond that made by the 118th, so the line held by these three regiments was consolidated during the night of the 17th, and the men





COMBINED OPERATIONS MAP 30 American Division A.E.F.



TOWNS TAKEN BY 118TH INFANTRY INDICATED ON THIS MAP IN RED INK.

dug in for protection and sleep. The companies did not average over one officer and 50 men at this time. During this last phase the 1st Battalion was commanded by Captain Arthur Lee of D Company, who had succeeded Captain Ligon upon his evacuation.

On the night of the 17th, the 120th Infantry relieved the 118th in the front line through the center and outskirts of the village of Abre DeGuise. The 3rd Battalion retired to a position 3,000 yards to the rear, while the 2nd took up its position on the left, covering the left flank of the 120th, at a distance to the rear of about 2,500 yards. The 1st Battalion moved to the eastern outskirts of the village of LaHaie Menneresse. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions remained here, but the 1st was ordered to advance in support of the 120th Infantry.

The 60th Brigade attacked on the morning of the 18th and while the line was advanced on the right, it was bent back on the left around the town of Mazinkhien. During this advance the 1st Battalion of the 118th was used to protect the flank of the 120th, following that Regiment at a distance of about 1,000 yards. The attack of the 60th Brigade was not a complete success on account of the resistance of the enemy in the towns of Mazinghein, Ecaillon and Ribeaucourt. The attack did not end here, however, and on the morning of the 19th, the 60th Brigade again attacked. The 1st Battalion of the 118th still went forward to protect the flank. All resistance was finally overcome and the Brigade was rapidly approaching its objective when orders were received for it to dig in and hold the line preparatory to being relieved by the 1st British Division.

After having been in almost constant action since the night of October 5th, the 118th Infantry was relieved on the night of the 19th of October and started a march out of the lines. On the 20th, the Regiment marched by way of Premont and Brancourt to Montbrehain, where it billeted for the night. The next day the march was continued through the towns of Ramicourt, Joncourt and Nauroy, the Regiment billeting for the night at Bellicourt. On the 22nd, the towns of Hargicourt, Templeux and Roisel were

passed and camp was pitched at Hervilly. Here we remained during the night, marching to Tincourt on the morning of October 23rd and entraining in that town on the night of the 23rd. After a trip of several hours it arrived at Albert and detrained there early on the morning of the 24th. The final and last lap of the march was made on that morning when the Regiment marched to the training area around Bazieux.

A brief summary of the October operations will give some idea of what the 118th accomplished in the fighting. The operations of the Division were no doubt a part of a general plan in which the British Armies and the 2nd Corps, First American Army, composed of the 30th and 27th Divisions, had been assigned the duty of pushing north-east between St. Quentin and Cambrai in an attempt to break the German line and force the enemy into Belgium. By cutting his main line of communications in this vicinity and by forcing him back out of France, the Armies on this front would be placing the enemy forces in Belgium and north of St. Quentin in a precarious condition. It was for this reason that the operations were deemed so important, and it is the belief of the men of the 118th Infantry that no single regiment contributed any more to the success of the general operations than this Regiment did. The following statistics are taken from official records, published either by the Division, the Brigade or the Regiment:

Having gone over the top on the morning of the 8th of October, after occupying the line for two days and three nights, this Regiment attacked as a front line unit on the mornings of the 9th, 11th and 17th, and followed in close support or reserve on October 10th, 18th and 19th. During the October operations the 30th Division penetrated to a depth of over 18,000 yards. The 118th Infantry occupied the front line during over 14,000 yards of this advance. The consolidated report of captured war material of the 118th Infantry shows that from October 8th, to October 20th, this Regiment captured 48 heavy machine guns, 166 light machine guns, 25 field guns, 72 trench mortars and 2,850 rifles. The Regimental report, showing prisoners captured

during the same time, shows 1,343 men and 76 officers captured. The casualties in the Regiment were very heavy, as evidenced by the following figures, which include the operation of September: Killed, 14 officers, 188 men, which does not include those who died in the hospitals of wounds, and 1,678 other casualties, which includes wounded, gassed and evacuated for other causes. The 59th Brigade report states that the total casualties of the Brigade were 3,496, including 465 killed. This report also shows that the Brigade penetrated to a depth of 15,400 yards in October and states that in considering the above figures it must be understood that the entire 118th Infantry was engaged in aiding the 60th Brigade on October 11th and was fighting in the front line the whole of that day, but no advance gained during that day are included in the above figures for the 59th Brigade. Some of these statistics are given in more detailed reports following this chapter.

Many things connected with these operations of the Regiment cannot be told in these pages. Only those who went through this terrible ordeal can have a vivid picture of the events that occurred, and, as a general rule, each man was limited in his perspective to what he himself saw and accomplished. One or two outstanding features were visible to all, and with these the author would like to deal briefly.

Perhaps the most impressive feature was the splendid work of the non-commissioned officers. The casualties among the officers were so severe that in a great many instances their duties devolved on the N. C. O.'s, who showed themselves capable of handling any emergency and of leading men to success time and time again. The records of individual feats of valor show that in a large percentage of these, non-commissioned officers performed in a degree of skill and courage that could not be surpassed. The record of decorations, as well as the numerous recommendations for promotion give some idea of the importance of the work of these young leaders.

Another feature was the individuality with which the men fought and their ability to cope with unforeseen and unexpected conditions. The fighting showed that the in-

fantryman had to bear the great burden of the fighting and that it was not possible to put very much dependence in most of the auxiliary arms attached to the infantry. These units, it is true, were at a great disadvantage in the semi-open warfare, that constituted the hardest fighting, but the fact remains that the front line infantryman had to do most of the work unaided.

In the great majority of cases, orders were very late in reaching the battalions, thus working a great hardship on the companies, as it was not possible to perfect plans in the short time given. It is very probable, from what the author has been able to gather, that the fault in the transmission of these orders lay higher than Brigade Headquarters. On more than one occasion, the orders were so late in reaching the company commanders that the attack started before they could have possibly gathered a clear conception of the duties required by the companies. This, together with the failure to furnish sufficient maps, might have resulted disastrously had it not been for the ability and initiative of the company commanders and their subordinates.

Before concluding this chapter special mention should be made of some of the auxiliary units of the Regiment.

The work of the Machine Gun Company is deserving of special mention on account of its operations on the morning of October 8th, in Brancourt, in which it very materially aided the 3rd Battalion in taking the town. All during the fighting this unit was very effective, although its effectiveness was greatly impaired during the last days of the fighting on account of the very heavy losses it sustained.

The Medical Detachment of the Regiment rendered very efficient service from the beginning. Establishing first aid posts in most instances under great difficulties, thousands of cases were handled with rapidity and care, the wounded receiving the best possible attention. Although the Detachment lost the services of several of its doctors, who were severely gassed, it continued to operate until the very end and to minister to the suffering wounded.

The Supply Company handled its duties with unusual efficiency, following the advances of the Regiment from day

to day and keeping the supplies moving forward. This Company has not been overlooked in this record but has been assigned a chapter in which the importance of this branch of the service is shown.

Perhaps one of the most important branches of service in modern warfare is the signal work. In the 118th this work was done by the Regimental Signal Platoon and a detachment from the 105th Signal Battalion. These two units kept up communications between Regimental Headquarters and the various Battalion Headquarters, showing great efficiency in their work. Most of the messages during the fighting, however, in front of the different Battalion Headquarters had to be done by runners, who deserve all the praise that can be bestowed upon them, as their duties were not only extremely hazardous but very tiring.

In conclusion, the following extracts from General Tyson's report are quoted as a tribute to the work of the men of the 118th Infantry:

"The above record is indeed a glorious one, and every officer and soldier of this command should be justly proud of it to his dying day." After mentioning the breaking of the Hindenburg Line, he continues: "And not only that, but we will also appreciate more fully the value of the battles won on the following days at Montbrehain, at Brancourt, at Premont, at Busigny, at Molain and at many lesser places, in all of which this Brigade was engaged. While the battle of Bellicourt was a bloody one, the battles above named were more so for this Brigade. A grateful country will not fail to give credit where credit is due, and the fame of this Brigade rests secure. The proudest heritage of the children of the soldiers of this Brigade will be the knowledge that their fathers fought in these battles of the greatest war of all times. As your Brigade Commander, I desire to express my great pride in this Brigade and to say how glad I am that I have had the honor to command it so long and to be a part and parcel of the fine record it has made. I have received nothing but loyalty and co-operation from each and every officer and man from the time I took command of it in November, 1917, down to this good hour, and this I appreciate more than words can express."

CHAPTER V.

AFTER THE ARMISTICE.

Having reached the Heilly Training Area, near Amiens, Regimental Headquarters was established in Bazieux, the 2nd Battalion, Headquarters Company and the Machine Gun Company also billeting in that town, while the 1st and 3rd Battalions located in Warloy. The first few days were spent in rest that came as a blessed relief to the weary, worn veterans. Within a few days, however, the same old drills and inspections started again preparatory to another trip to the front. The Regiment participated in athletic events, in which the Brigade, Division and Corps took part, the 118th winning the Brigade meet from the 117th and the 114th Machine Gun Battalion. For the first time in many weeks the men received baths and their clothing was deloused. During the first week in November replacements began to arrive, most of whom had been given only a short period of training in the United States, but, fortunately for the Regiment, many of the men who had been slightly wounded, returned to it after a short stay in the hospitals. Realizing that within a few days the Division would be ordered up to the front again, the officers worked very hard with the new men in an attempt to get them in shape for fighting.

On the night of November 10th, news of the armistice reached the men, putting an end to the tension and suspense under which everybody had been working for the past two weeks. The news was received more quietly than might have been expected, but that was probably due to the fact that the men had been through so much that they did not care to express themselves by giving away to any emotion. Almost as soon as it was officially stated that the Armistice had been signed, talk of going home began. There was a relaxation on the part of officers and men that was very noticeable, and while the drill and work did not stop, they were done with glad hearts and with a different spirit. Within a few days orders were received to turn in

certain British equipment and preparations were begun for another move of the Division. On November 22nd the Regiment moved into the Le Mans area, arriving there after a twenty-four hour trip on troop trains. After having been affiliated with the British for over six months, the Regiment had severed its connections with them and was once again a part and parcel of the American Expeditionary Forces in every sense of the word.

By the night of November 24th, the entire Regiment had reached the new area, Regimental Headquarters and the auxiliary companies billeting in Montbizot, the 3rd Battalion in LaGuierche, the 2nd in Souligne and the 1st in Montbizot and the outskirts. As this was the area assigned to troops who would make an early departure for America, it was generally believed throughout the Regiment that we would soon be on the deep blue sea. Every day some fresh rumor would raise our hopes of an immediate departure, but it began to seem that we had talked too quick. Living under conditions that could certainly not be called ideal, we spent the months of December, January and a part of February in this area. Drills and maneuvers were the order of the day. It is probable that the men of the Regiment will long remember Christmas, 1918, as it probably meant less to them than any previous one or any future one ever will mean. Afternoon drills were discontinued during January, making the days even longer than before, as there were very few forms of amusement in these little villages.

The time spent in this area was made harder to bear for a great many of the men on account of the failure of the Government to pay them regularly. Perhaps one of the blackest spots in the record of the A. E. F. was the rank failure of the pay system. Having issued pay cards to the men, they were not allowed to use them, in this Regiment, at least. These cards were issued in order that the men whose service records had been misplaced, could receive their pay, regulations forbidding a man's name to appear on a pay roll unless his service record was within his regiment. As lots of these had been misplaced, through no fault of the men, these soldiers, who had risked their all,

sometimes went three and four months without receiving one cent of pay. It was not confined to a few men, but in one company alone there were over forty men who did not receive any pay for three months. As the same delay in payment seemed to have existed in other divisions, it would seem that the fault lay in some one high in authority. The practical result of this delay was to place a great many men in such a position that they could not even purchase a package of cigarettes.

In spite of the hardships endured and the handicaps under which they lived, the men did not complain very much and got what enjoyment was possible out of life. The living quarters were crowded, without heat and light, while the constant rain was enough to dampen the spirits of a mermaid; yet the men retained their good humor and health. An occasional leave to Le Mans constituted the chief diversion, while band concerts, the Y. M. C. A. tents and poker were the other principal amusements. One day was spent very much like another for two and a half months, during which the greatest topic of conversation was the date of sailing for home.

During December Colonel Wolfe left the Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel W. F. L. Hartigan assuming command upon his departure. Colonel Hartigan had been with the Division for several months and had been sent to the 118th to fill the vacancy caused by the return of Colonel Spratt to the United States. Colonel C. H. Healey assumed command, but remained with the Regiment only a short time, having been transferred to some other division. The Regiment lost some of its oldest and most efficient officers in January, these gentlemen having requested transfers in order that they might be placed in the regular army. Among those transferred were Major Poe, who had rendered faithful service as the head of the Medical Department, and Major McFadden, Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion, this officer having received his majority after having handled the battalion throughout practically all of its engagements. Upon the transfer of Colonel Healey, the Regiment was fortunate in having Colonel

McCully, the old Commanding Officer, return to us. It was a pleasure to have him in command when the return to America was made.

Having made a complete inspection of the Division on January 21st, General Pershing made the following statement in a letter to General Lewis, which was published throughout the Regiment:

"It gives me great pleasure to extend to you and the officers and men of the 30th Division my sincere compliments upon their appearance at the review and inspection on the 21st of January, southwest of Teille, which was excellent and is just what would be expected in a command with such a splendid fighting record. It is gratifying to see your troops in such good physical shape, but still more so to know that this almost ideal condition will continue to the end of their service and beyond, as an exemplification of their high character and soldierly qualities."

The officers had the pleasure of listening to an address by General Pershing during the next week, in which he laid emphasis on the part played by this Division during the time it fought with the British.

After dozens of false rumors, the Regiment finally received real orders to move to the forwarding camp on the outskirts of Le Mans. On February 7th, after a march of about fifteen miles, the forwarding camp was reached and for the first time in many months the Regiment again occupied an American camp, men and officers being quartered in long wooden buildings, in which there were rough beds or bunks. According to all the information that could be gathered, previous units who had occupied these quarters had remained here only a few days and had been sent from here to a port of embarkation, so once again our hopes were raised. Physical examinations, equipment inspections and delousing were indulged in extensively, each inspection giving rise to a new rumor of immediate departure. On February 15th, the clearance certificate was given to the Personnel Adjutant, stating that the paper work of the Regiment was complete and up to date. For some unknown reason, however, the entire Division was detained in the

forwarding camp and this Regiment did not leave until the 8th and 9th of March.

By the morning of the 10th of March the entire Regiment had reached the port of Saint Nazaire, a port which in many ways resembled an American city on account of the immense warehouses and the thousands of American troops stationed there. Again the men were put through the delousing process and were given another physical examination before boarding transports. On the 15th of March, a large part of the Regiment boarded the U. S. S. Mercury, and by seven o'clock in the afternoon had passed out of sight of land. On the 16th the remaining units sailed on the U. S. S. Pocohontas along with part of the 117th Infantry.

The return trip was made in twelve days, during which the sea was extremely calm; the trip being devoid of excitement making the time seem longer than it actually was. Landing at Charleston, S. C., on March 27th, the Regiment immediately entrained for Camp Jackson, S. C., where the final work of discharging the men was to be completed. On April 1st, the Regiment paraded in Columbia before a vast crowd that had come from the Carolinas and Tennessee to welcome the 30th Division on its return from the battlefields of Europe. On the same afternoon the discharging of the men began, and by the end of the week there was nothing but the skeleton of the once famous organization in existence. The men who had been inducted into service in camps other than Camp Sevier and Camp Jackson were returned to these other camps for final discharge.

The parting of the ways was so hurried and the anxiety of the men to see their loved ones once again was so keen that there was very little sentiment connected with the breaking up of the regiment. It is sincerely hoped that the vast majority of the men will be present at the first annual meeting of the Old Hickory Association in Greenville, S. C., which will be held during the last week in September of this year. One can imagine the pleasure of having all the men who formerly served in the 118th Infantry meet on an equal basis, talk over the days that have passed, and renew friendships that have stood the test of blood and iron.

CHAPTER VI.

THE SUPPLY COMPANY.

The following account of the work and organization of the Supply Company of the Regiment has as one of its principal objects a comparison between the different methods of handling supplies in the American and British Armies. It was the belief of the men who worked in this branch of the service that the British method was far superior to the American method in many respects, and it was in the hope that a realization of this be brought to the attention of some one in authority in the Quartermaster Department of our Army that Captain Robert T. Brown, Regimental Supply Officer, has contributed the following account.

Much would have to be written if an attempt were made to record in detail all the work done by the Supply Company. It can readily be seen that no work done by any part of the Regiment could have been accomplished without direct connection with this Company.

The Supply Company, commanded by the Regimental Supply Officer, is directly responsible for the drawing, transporting and issuing of every article of food, clothing and equipment, except medicines, used by the entire Regiment. The table of organization of the Supply Company of an infantry Regiment authorized the following personnel: One captain, Regimental Supply Officer, commanding; one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant and one hundred and sixty-four enlisted men. This number was found to be utterly inadequate and was increased by attachment of officers and men from line companies of the Regiment, to eight officers and two hundred eighty-six men. This number of officers and men were used on the Ypres front and proved to be ideal, giving efficiency under almost any circumstances. On the Bellicourt front the shortage of officers in the Regiment caused the number of officers with the Supply Company to be reduced to five, and it was with the handicap of this shortage that the Supply Company functioned during this operation.

Upon arrival in France, our Division was attached for duty with the British Army, which necessitated the use of almost complete British equipment and also the British ration. By special arrangement, the Americans were issued coffee and five per cent. more fresh meat per ration than the Tommies. This practically complete adoption of British equipment and supplies, and, as we were to operate with them, made it necessary for us to adopt their system. This would have been a comparatively simple matter had we adopted as a whole their system, which had been established upon experience gained by them in recent wars and which was proven during four years' operation in this war to be an absolute success. As usual, this was not done, and all serious troubles met with while operating with the British was caused by the lack of something which was not adopted from them by us.

In changing over to the British system the Supply Company was at once divided into four separate detachments, one being assigned to each battalion and the fourth, under the Regimental Supply Officer, was detached from the Regiment and placed in charge of an Area Ration Refilling point. The ration supply of the 118th Infantry was looked after by the Supply Officer from this place and the British ration system was soon thoroughly understood and working without a hitch.

With the other equipment and supplies it was different. The Supply Company detachments were responsible directly for the drawing and proper distribution of these supplies. and they not only did not know or have any one to tell them how to make requisitions for the needs of the battalions, but they had no table of allowances by which to issue the equipment which had been issued to them automatically. There were no blank forms on hand and the inexperienced detachments would not have known what to do with them had they been available. The credit is due First Lieutenant H. A. Kluge for the keeping of all Regimental supply records which were kept during this time.

The first try out of the new system when on the march showed an alarming shortage of transportation but proved the ration system to be absolutely efficient. This serious shortage of transportation was never corrected but was helped before the next move by the addition of six wagons and by a material reduction in the authorized baggage allowance of the Regiment. The officers' baggage allowance was reduced to a maximum of fifty pounds. Upon arrival in Belgium and on going into the line there it was found that the Regiment was short of clothing and equipment, and also it was found that no records were being kept showing what was on hand, what had been drawn or just what was needed by the Regiment. Property reports were constantly being called for which could not be furnished, and it was seen that they could not be furnished unless the supply personnel, with each separate unit, were again increased and trained in this work. This was not practicable at this time, and, seeing that these difficulties were growing in the battalions and separate units, and knowing that he had in the supply sufficient experienced enlisted personnel with which to establish one competent recording office for the entire Regiment, the Regimental Supply Officer requested that this be done. The advantage in relieving the battalions and separate units of this work and of being able to get property reports for the Regiment from one office instead of five was at once recognized by Colonel McCully, and this system was adopted by him in the 118th. Within a short time the advantages of this system became so apparent that it was adopted by the Division. The method of keeping a correct record of requests and issues, with dates, was devised by Regimental Supply Sergeant J. Furman Arnold, and on account of its simplicity and convenience, combined with accuracy, it was adopted by the Division Inspector.

The first great difficulty to overcome was the shortage of officers. There was only one officer with each section of the Supply Company, which made it absolutely necessary that enlisted man be called upon to act as assistants to these officers and in so doing assume the duties and respon-

sibilities of officers. These places were filled with a marked degree of efficiency by enlisted men, to whom great credit is due. In the British and Australian units, who operated with us and under the same identical circumstances, the exact relative positions to those filled by these men were filled by commissioned officers. Unfortunately, promotion was denied these men, as it was ruled that no matter how efficient a man proved himself to be, or how well suited he was for a position as a commissioned officer in the Supply Company, he could not be commissioned unless he was able to pass the examination required in line company duties. This was out of the question, as the men in the Supply Company do not have an opportunity to learn line company work.

Too much praise could hardly be given the British system of transportation and supplies. The tributes made by us while serving with them and especially those made after we came back under the American system are ample indication as to which is the better. The difference between the American and British systems was so noticeable to those who had worked under both that it was commented on by all ranks. The systems of supplying clothes and equipment are similar in both armies insofar as they effect the lower units and individuals, but the ration systems are entirely different. The American Army is still using the old warehouse, ten day issue system, which places troops out of barracks and away from spacious warehouses in a serious predicament. Simply speaking, we found that the American system was unweildy and not adapted to active warfare. The British system has a daily issue basis which gives it a remarkable degree of elasticity with efficiency under all conditions. Their system keeps in operation every day an organized force with transportation which can take care of whatever difficulties which may be expected under most severe conditions. Under this system, for instance, divisional warehouses and places of storage are unnecessary, the rations being delivered daily direct from the rail head to the troops, where they are divided and loaded on covered wagons the same day. Their system is

arranged in such a way that the troops always have two days' rations on hand. In unusual cases where a unit is unable to get their request in on time for the daily consolidation, the officer in charge simply duplicates the last former request and makes the necessary additions or deductions on the next day's request, in case a change in strength made the duplication incorrect.

The number of rations requested by the rail head supply officer is sent to him the next morning in what is called a pack train. They are at once divided, loaded on motor trucks, and are sent out to the distribution points, where they are again divided and loaded on the regimental or separate units second line transports. They are kept on these wagons overnight and are delivered to the battalions or first line transports the following morning, who deliver them to the company kitchens in the afternoon. The second line wagons, after delivering rations to the battalions in the morning, return at once to the distribution point and refill with the rations which have come up to the point by lorry. This gives a regiment two full days and the unconsumed portion of the third day's ration on hand at all times.

Under this system, in case of a sudden move a telegram will switch the pack train to the new location. Likewise, a message will direct the lorries to a different location of the distribution point, and the same applies on down to the companies. The same will apply in case only a part of a unit moves, as any part of a day's ration for a unit can be switched to a new location and the men shifted, take with them from the old location the two days' ration which had been delivered there. In case of an advance, the haul made by trains, lorries and wagons are simply lengthened and the men continue to be fed daily regardless of the distance they advance. The same applies in case of a retreat, the enemy never being able to capture more than a day's rations in a bulk unless he captures the whole country, as the only warehouses are too far back to be surprised. These are only a few of the many advantages of the British system over the American and the only disadvantage noticed was

that the British system requires more men and officers and more transportation to handle it. This disadvantage is more than made up for by the fact that it gives efficiency, and no number of men, however great, at the front are of much value unless they are properly supplied, and the better they are fed and supplied, the more efficient they are. While operating under the British system, the 118th Infantry holds the record of not having missed a single day, either in camp, when on the march, or during their big advance, in getting rations up to the units. There was no spectacular work to be done by the Supply Company, but the importance of their work was second to no other branch of the regiment and sharing the dangers and hardships of the Regiment, they did their work as a whole with determination and efficiency.



LIEUTENANT JAMES C. DOZIER

Awarded the Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action near Montbrehain, France, October 8th, 1918, also the British Military Cross by the British Government.

SERGEANT THOMAS L. HALL

Awarded the Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action near Montbrehain, France, October 8th, 1918.



CHAPTER VII.

SOME STATISTICS.

The 118th Infantry has the proud record of having had more men receive the Medal of Honor than any regiment in the American Expeditionary Forces. The following accounts are the official citations of the War Department covering the six awards. In every instance these men were residents of the State of South Carolina, the State that gave origin to this famous Regiment. The citations follow:

"James C. Dozier, first lieutenant, Company G, 118th Infantry. For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action with the enemy near Montbrehain, France, Oct. 8th, 1918. In command of two platoons, Lieutenant Dozier was painfully wounded in the shoulder early in the attack but continued to lead his men, displaying the highest bravery and skill. When his command was held up by heavy machine-gun fire he disposed his men in the best cover available and with a soldier continued forward to attack a machine-gun nest. Creeping up to the position in the face of intense fire, he killed the entire crew with hand grenades and his pistol and a little later captured a number of Germans, who had taken refuge in a dugout nearby." Home address, Rock Hill, S. C.

In addition to receiving the Medal of Honor, Lieutenant Dozier was awarded the British Military Cross by the British Government.

"Thomas Lee Hall (Deceased) sergeant, Company G, 118th Infantry. For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action with the enemy near Montbrehain, France, October 8th, 1918. Having overcome two machine-gun nests under his skilful leadership. Sergt. Hall's platoon was stopped 800 yards from its final objective by machine gun fire of particular intensity. Ordering his men to take cover in a sunken road, he advanced alone on the enemy machine-gun post and killed five members of the crew with his bayonet and thereby made possible the further advance of the line. While attacking another machine gun nest later in the day this gallant soldier was mortally wounded." Home address, Fort Mill, S. C.

"Gary Evans Foster, sergeant Company F, 118th Infantry. For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty with the enemy near Montbrehain, France, October 8th, 1918. When his company was held up by violent machine-gun fire from a sunken road, Sergt. Foster, with an officer, went forward to attack the hostile machine-gun nests. The officer was wounded but Sergeant Foster continued on alone in the face of heavy fire and by effective use of hand grenades and his pistol killed several of the enemy and captured eighteen." Home address, Inman, S. C.

"Richmond H. Hilton, sergeant Company M, 118th Infantry. For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action with the enemy at Brancourt, France, October 11th, 1918. While Sergt. Hilton's company was advancing through the village of Brancourt it was held up by intense enfilading fire from a machine gun. Discovering that this fire came from a machine gun nest among shell holes at the edge of the town, Sergt. Hilton, accompanied by a few other soldiers, but well in advance of them, pressed on toward this position, firing with his rifle until his ammunition was exhausted, and then with his pistol killing six of the enemy and capturing ten. In the course of this daring exploit he received a wound from a bursting shell which resulted in the loss of his arm." Home address, Westville, S. C.

Sergeant Hilton was also awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal by the British Government.

"John C. Villepigue, corporal, Company M. 118th Infantry. For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action with the enemy at Vaux Andigny, France, October 15th, 1918. Having been sent out with two other soldiers to scout through the village of Vaux Andigny, he met with strong resistance from enemy machine gun fire, which killed one of his men and wounded the other. Continuing his advance without aid 500 yards in advance of his platoon and in the face of machine gun and artillery fire, he encountered four of the enemy in a dugout, whom he attacked and killed with a hand grenade. Crawling forward to a point 150 yards in advance of his first encounter, he rushed a machine gun nest, killing four and capturing six of the enemy and taking two light machine guns. After being joined by his platoon he was severely wounded in the arm." Home address, Camden, S. C.



SERGEANT GARY E. FOSTER

Awarded the Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action near Montbrehain, France, October 8th, 1918.

SERGEANT RICHMOND H. HILTON

Awarded the Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action near Brancourt, France, October 11th, 1918. Also the Distinguished Conduct Medal by the British Government.






CORPORAL JOHN C. VILLEPIGUE

Awarded the Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action at Vaux Andigny, France, October 15th, 1918. Also the British Distinguished Conduct Medal by the British Government

CORPORAL JAMES D. HERIOT

Awarded the Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action at Vaux Andigny, France, October 11th, 1918.



Corporal Villepigue also received the British Distinguished Conduct Medal.

"James D. Heriot (Deceased) corporal, Company I, 118th Infantry. For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action with the enemy at Vaux Andigny, France, October 11th, 1918. Corporal Heriot, with four other soldiers, organized a combat group and attacked an enemy machine gun nest which had been inflicting heavy casualties on his company. In the advance two of his men were killed, and because of the heavy fire from all sides the remaining two sought shelter. Unmindful of the hazard attached to the mission, Corporal Heriot, with fixed bayonet, alone, charged the machine gun, making his way through the fire for a distance of 30 yards, and forcing the enemy to surrender. During this exploit he received several wounds in the arm, and later in the same day, while charging another nest, he was killed." Home address, Providence, S. C.

The following list of other men in the Regiment who were awarded medals for bravery in action is not as complete as the author would like to have it, but is as complete as possible from obtainable information. Even since the dissolution of the Regiment there have been awards, but an attempt to secure a complete list of all the men who were thus honored, from the War Department, has resulted in only a partial list. It is regretable that it is not possible to insert the official citation of each case that follows.

The following men received the American Distinguished Service Cross:

	Company.
Captain L. L. Ligon	B
Captain J. W. Lawlor	F
First Lieutenant J. M. Schwing	F
Second Lieutenant C. W. Prause	I
Sergeant J. H. Gardner	L
Sergeant Samuel W. Fore	E
Sergeant Frank A. Burroughs	Machine Gun
Sergeant Joe E. Turner	D
Corporal Paul K. Sinclair	M
Corporal Y. Z. Weeks	I
Corporal Curtis M. Strickland	M

Private John C. Carter	Medical Det.
Private George A. Bushing	G
Private Ernest B. Greene	D
Private Phillip Miller	D
Private Callie A. Smith	G
Private Rufus R. Philips	F
Private Ernest Morgan	L
Private William F. Jones	Medical Det.
Private James K. Faison	Medical Det.
Private Paul L. Hartley	L
Private Albert J. Peaden	M
Private Albert F. Cranford	D

Lieutenant Zebulon Thornburg was recommended for the Distinguished Service Cross and it is very probable that he has received it by this time, but the author has not been able to secure any definite information as Lieutenant Thornburg was seriously wounded and was at last reports still in some hospital.

The following men were awarded the British Distinguished Conduct Medal:

	Company.
Sergeant J. J. Treacy	I
Sergeant J. H. Gardner	L
Mechanic M. M. Funderbunk	I
Corporal Y. Z. Weeks	I
Private Rufus R. Phillips	F
Private Ernest Morgan	L
Private James K. Faison	Medical Det.
Private R. Verbeke	D

Sergeant J. Felder of D Company, Sergeant Clarence M. Dinkins of M Company, Corporal M. McAbee of D Company and Private Callie A. Smith of F Company were awarded the British Military Medal.

The following is an incomplete list of the men in the Regiment who were cited in Division Orders:

	Company.
Sergeant Dean S. Hartley	L
Sergeant Clarence M. Dinkins	M
Sergeant Robert D. Alexander	K
Corporal Roland C. Thomas	M
Private David W. Lyons	L
Private Henry B. Hunt	L
Private Carl O. Jones (Deceased)	E
Private Myer Berkman	K

Private Claude M. Smoak	Medical Det.
Private William L. Stumbo	H
Private Edward W. Knight (Deceased)	K
Private John W. Young	M
Private Benjamin N. Wright	M
Private Charles Y. Hoffman	Medical Det.
Private Charles E. Mayberry	L
Private Fred C. Hinsch	G
Private Charles Heath	G
Private Lonnie E. McCutcheon	E
Private Bora G. Hyman	L
Private Loater L. McKinney	F
Private Aaron B. Miller	F
Private Roe Bradley	F

As evidence of the nature of the fighting participated in by this Regiment, the following report of casualties among the officers is given:

KILLED

Captain A. Zane Pyles	Regimental Adjutant
Captain Wm. A. Jones	Company L
First Lieutenant W. A. Hudgens	Adjutant, 3rd Battalion
First Lieutenant P. B. N. Earle	Company M
First Lieutenant W. A. Mulloy	Company I
First Lieutenant George F. Read	Company F
First Lieutenant Wm. K. Frampton	Company D
Second Lieutenant Wm. O. Stevenson	Company A
Second Lieutenant M. W. Jones	Headquarters Company
Second Lieutenant Tillman R. Smith	Company F
Second Lieutenant Henry J. Brown	Company K
Second Lieutenant Robert E. Farmer	Company F
Second Lieutenant Charles Reshrig	Company L

WOUNDED

Major Gabriel H. Mahon	1st Battalion
Major James H. Howell	3rd Battalion
Captain Hiram Hutchinson	Company K
Captain Jesse T. Crawford	Company C
Captain Samuel W. Parks	Company G
Captain Robert W. Hudgens	Headquarters Company
First Lieutenant James Anderson	Company K
First Lieutenant Richard S. Gessford	Company K
First Lieutenant Harry E. Wickes	Company L
First Lieutenant Henry W. Ruhl	Headquarters Company
First Lieutenant Sam J. Royall	Headquarters Company
First Lieutenant James C. Dozier	Company G
First Lieutenant James A. Schwing	Headquarters Company
First Lieutenant Gottlieb A. Neuffer	Machine Gun Company
Second Lieutenant John B. Howard	Company H
Second Lieutenant Daniel T. Smith	Company E
Second Lieutenant Zebulon B. Thornburg	Company F
Second Lieutenant Paul F. Newell	Company G
Second Lieutenant Edgar E. McNeil	Machine Gun Company
Second Lieutenant Jesse M. Barton	Headquarters Company
Second Lieutenant Jerry B. Fenton	Company D
Second Lieutenant Carl T. Prause	Company I

GASSED

Captain L. L. Ligon	Company B
Captain Fred E. Stuart	Attached, 105th Signal Bn.
First Lieutenant W. W. Wingo	Headquarters Company
First Lieutenant Paul C. Bradshaw	Adjutant, 1st Battalion
First Lieutenant Harry G. Kessenich	Headquarters Company
First Lieutenant Joe T. Smith	Company L
First Lieutenant Henry P. Ledford	Medical Corps
First Lieutenant Burman D. Moore	Medical Corps
First Lieutenant John H. Wiggs	Company H
Second Lieutenant Alfred O'Neal	Company H
Second Lieutenant Atlas M. Pickett	Company D
Second Lieutenant Robert M. Maxey	Company L

In addition to the above, it was necessary to evacuate a few other officers, who are not reported as battle casualties, on account of sickness and accidents. Some of these would not leave the lines until ordered to do so. The above report was made soon after the Regiment came out of the lines in October and there are no doubt a few additional names which should be added.

DETAILED REPORT OF CASUALTIES FROM SEPTEMBER 23 TO OCTOBER 29,
1918, IN THE 118TH INFANTRY.

Organization.	Killed.	Wounded.	Gassed.	Missing.	Evacuated.
1st Battalion—					
Officers	2	3	2	..	5
Men	36	204	178	23	38
2nd Battalion—					
Officers	3	6	2	..	1
Men	59	381	98	45	45
3rd Battalion—					
Officers	6	6	2	..	2
Men	79	310	65	28	52
Headquarters Co.—					
Officers	2	5	3
Men	5	13	75	2	37
Supply Company—					
Officers
Men	2	2
Machine Gun Company—					
Officers	2	2
Men	9	34	12	..	3
Medical Detachment—					
Officers	2	..	1
Men	6	16	..	2

TOTAL CASUALTIES.

Organization.	Officers.	Men.
1st Battalion	12	479
2nd Battalion	12	624
3rd Battalion	16	514
Headquarters Company	10	132
Machine Gun Company	4	48
Supply Company	2
Medical Detachment	3	24
	57	1,823

The above detailed report was made on October 29th, 1918, and cannot be relied on as absolutely correct. It does not include the men who died of wounds in hospitals, but it can be taken, however, as an indication of what this Regiment went through with in a little over a month.

The following extracts from a few of the laudatory messages received by the 30th Division and the 118th Infantry should be of interest as showing how the efforts of this Division were appreciated throughout the world:

Extract from General Order No. 3, Headquarters 60th Infantry Brigade, October 29, 1918:

4. "In the fighting of October 11th, the 118th Infantry Regiment fought with this Brigade. It was entirely successful and displayed those soldierly qualities of fortitude, courage and skill which demand the high admiration of the Brigade Commander. That Regiment is heartily congratulated, as is the 3rd Battalion of the 117th Infantry Regiment, which fought with this Brigade on October 19th. Much credit is due these organizations: they contributed much to the success of this Brigade."

S. L. Faison,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

General Order No. 22, Headquarters 118th Infantry, October 4th, 1918:

1. "The Regimental Commander desires to express to the officers and men of the Regiment his appreciation of their heroic conduct in their first battle.

2. For five days the Regiment held the front of the Divisional Sector, advancing the line and repelling an enemy raid. In the advance of the Division, the Regiment was assigned the most important position as the Divisional reserve. The 2nd Battalion and the Machine Gun Company were sent to reinforce the left of the line. Other companies were engaged in trying service, aiding the wounded and burying the dead. All organizations shared in the Regiment's contribution to the Division's great victory, the breaking of the Hindenburg Line, once thought impregnable.

3. These are actions whose mere recital must stir the imagination. Men engaged in such deeds have won the right to stand in the ranks of the valiant.

4. In this day of victory we record our deep springing sorrow for our comrades who have given their lives to the Cause; what they have done will be remembered as long as America honors valor."

Orrin R. Wolfe,
Colonel Infantry.

Field Marshal Haig, in his resume of the operations of the 30th and 27th Divisions while with his forces, made the following statements. His report was dated October 20th, 1918:

"In the course of the last three weeks the 27th and 30th Divisions of the 2nd Corps, operating with the 4th British Army, have taken part with great gallantry and success in three major offensive operations, besides being engaged in a number of lesser attacks. In the course of the fighting they displayed soldierly qualities of a high order and have materially assisted in the success of our attacks."

"Having fought with the utmost dash and bravery in the great attack of September 29th, in which the Hindenburg Line was broken, and having on this occasion captured the villages of Bellicourt and Nauroy, with a large number of prisoners, on October 8th, the troops of the 2nd American Army Corps again attacked in the neighborhood of Montbrehain. In three days of successful fighting they completed an advance of ten miles from Montbrehain to St. Souplet, overcoming determined resistance and captured several strongly defended villages and woods. Throughout the past three days they have again attacked daily and in each occasion with complete success, though the enemy's resistance was most obstinate."

The following communication, addressed to the Commanding General, 30th Division, by the Mayor of Busigny, under date of October 17th, was published for the command:

"Acting as a representative of the Commune, and in its name, consequently in the name, too, of a part of France, I take the liberty to come and express to our liberator and to the gallant troops under your command our feeling of deepest and eternal gratitude.

"For those who have not been submitted, as we have been for four years, to the intolerable and abhorred German yoke, it is difficult to realize how great were the relief, the joy, the well being, in a word, of the unexpressible happiness we all felt when the first Allied troops made their way through our village and the great event has been for us like the dawn of a resurrection. I should be very thankful to you if you would convey to all your officers, N. C. O.'s and men under your command, our deep feeling of admiration and eternal gratitude. Please, sir, accept the expression of my highest consideration and believe me,

"Yours most devotedly,

"The Mayor,
"E. Mairis."

During the ten months spent in France by this Regiment, a great many transfers were made in the officer personnel. The following list of officers contains the names and addresses of the great majority of these. These addresses were furnished at the time these officers joined the Regiment.

COLONELS:

P. K. McCully, Anderson, S. C.
O. R. Wolfe, Regular Army.
G. H. Healey, Rensselaer, Ind.

LIEUTENANT-COLONELS:

W. F. L. Hartigan, Regular Army.
Thos. B. Spratt, Fort Mill, S. C.
David Walley, Richton, Miss.

MAJORS:

J. T. Crawford, Williamston, S. C.
W. L. Gillespie, Cheraw, S. C.

J. H. Howell, Waynesville, S. C.
 R. C. Heyward, Pelzer, S. C.
 G. H. Mahon, Greenville, S. C.
 L. C. McFadden, Rock Hill, S. C.
 James A. Poore, Columbia, S. C.
 W. D. Workman, Greenville, S. C.
 C. C. Wyche, Spartanburg, S. C.

CAPTAINS:

F. J. Beatty, Greenville, S. C.
 S. E. Beers, Madison, Wis.
 E. S. Blake, Belton, S. C.
 P. M. Brown, Sumter, S. C.
 R. T. Brown, Myers Mill, S. C.
 R. E. Craig, Hartsville, S. C.
 R. A. Fulp, Fort Mill, S. C.
 L. D. Hill, Knoxville, Tenn.
 P. H. Hoge, Pewee Valley, Ky.
 Robt. W. Hudgens, Mountville, S. C.
 Hiram Hutchinson, Rock Hill, S. C.
 W. W. Jones (Killed), 183 Johnson Ave., Newark, N. J.
 C. M. Kephart, High Point, N. C.
 J. W. Lawlor, 71 Chestnut St., Montclair, N. J.
 Arthur Lee, Greenwood, S. C.
 Robert E. Lee, 3623 Leland Ave., Chicago, Ill.
 L. L. Ligon, Anderson, S. C.
 R. A. McBrayer, Asheville, N. C.
 F. M. Mack, Fort Mill, S. C.
 Harry Miller, 318 N. Seventh St., Terre Haute, Ind.
 W. F. Murrah, Memphis, Tenn.
 Sam W. Parks, Fort Mill, S. C.
 A. Zane Pyles (Killed), Washington, D. C.
 Ralph J. Ramer, Anderson, S. C.
 C. G. Rea, Muncie, Ind.
 John W. Sands, Glenn Ridge, N. J.
 H. C. Underwood.
 L. W. Watkins, Greenville, S. C.
 Sam D. Willis, Greenville, S. C.

FIRST LIEUTENANTS:

James Anderson, Easley, S. C.
 E. L. Averitt, 507 Wallen St., Portsmouth, O.
 G. C. Bailey, Pelzer, S. C.
 E. C. Bardwell, 150 Oakland St., Springfield, Mass.
 S. L. Blackmar, 4847 E. 65th St., Portland, Ore.
 P. E. Bradshaw, Anderson, S. C.
 Eugene F. Carroll.
 L. C. Cobb, 115 W. 2nd St., Waterloo, Ia.
 R. H. Cobb, Denmark, Maine.
 H. M. Crawford, 51 Matthews St., Pontiac, Mich.
 Wm. N. Cork, Rock Hill, S. C.
 J. C. Dozier, Rock Hill, S. C.
 T. P. Duckett, Fountain Inn, S. C.
 P. B. W. Earle (Killed), 1600 W. Central Ave, Knoxville, Tenn.
 B. M. Eppes, Edgefield, S. C.
 Franklin Fouse, Winchester, Ind.
 W. W. Frampton (Killed), Fenton, Del.
 J. W. Franklin, Mount Airy, N. C.
 R. S. Gessford, 3123 13th St., N. W., Washington, D. C.
 F. W. Graves, Silver Creek, N. J.
 H. C. Hall, Sonia, Mich.
 A. D. Hargrove, Marshallville, Ga.
 Fred R. Hill, La Fontain, Ind.
 G. M. Hoke, Greenville, S. C.
 F. J. Hombach, 608 1st Ave., Council Bluffs, Ia.
 Wm. A. Hudgens (Killed), Anderson, S. C.
 B. W. Hughes, 6543 Minerva Ave., Chicago, Ill.
 E. L. Hughes, Greenville, S. C.
 J. H. Hughes, Cedar Grove, N. C.
 W. A. Huey, Rock Hill, S. C.
 Paul Kaminiski, 2117 Maple St., Omaha, Neb.
 H. A. Kear, Washington, N. C.
 Harry Kessenich, Madison, Wis.
 H. A. Kluge, 509 Maryland Ave., Washington, D. C.
 C. W. Koffman, Oregon City, Oregon.
 J. H. Koon, 296 College St., Asheville, N. C.
 H. S. Ledford, Stackville, N. C.

P. C. Love, 2730 Sacramento St., St. Joseph, Mo.
 A. M. McLeod, Camden, S. C.
 R. R. McLeod, Hartsville, S. C.
 J. J. Matthews, 6328 Kimbark Ave., Chicago, Ill.
 B. D. Moore, Mt. Holly, N. C.
 D. M. Morgan, Cambria, Wis.
 W. H. Morman, Warsaw, Wis.
 W. A. Mulloy (Killed), Cheraw, S. C.
 N. E. Nash, Two Rivers, Wis.
 G. A. Neuffer, Abbeville, S. C.
 P. L. Newell, Randolph, Miss.
 O. A. Olverson, Clark, S. Dakota.
 D. E. Penland, Asheville, N. C.
 H. E. Porter, 705 East 6th St., Wilmington, Del.
 S. M. Reber, Tremont, Mich.
 G. J. Read (Killed), 4207 W. Congress St., Chicago, Ill.
 Sam J. Royall, Florence, S. C.
 Henry W. Ruhl, Clarksburg, W. Va.
 O. L. Sanders, 5325 Main St., Baltimore, Md.
 James A. Schwing, Spartanburg, S. C.
 A. C. Shuler, 2346 Riverside Ave., Jacksonville.
 D. R. Simpson, Laurens, S. C.
 Joe F. Smith, Laurens, S. C.
 P. B. Speed, Abbeville, S. C.
 H. E. Wicks, 601 Mountain Ave., Roanoke, Va.
 J. H. Wiggs, Cowan, Tenn.
 W. D. Wilkinson, Abbeville, S. C.
 W. W. Wingo, Greenville, S. C.

SECOND LIEUTENANTS:

Pierce Atwater, 1400 W. 26th St., Minneapolis, Minn.
 J. M. Barton, Barton, Ohio.
 H. J. Blakely, Mt. Pleasant, Tenn.
 Edward Bradford, Sumter, S. C.
 H. J. Brown (Killed), Chicago, Ill.
 J. R. Butler, 22 Greenfield Ave., Saratoga Springs, N. Y.
 W. Chamberlain, 704 E. 50th St., Chicago, Ill.
 Clyde A. Clancy, 440 Fourth St., Niagara Falls, N. Y.
 S. G. Coates, Berwyn, Pa.

- H. E. Cloughly, 122 W. 90th St., New York City.
 T. B. Doolittle, 154 Wentworth St., Charleston, S. C.
 W. L. Dyer, Idaho.
 C. S. Easley, Greenville, S. C.
 R. E. Farmer (Killed), Anderson, S. C.
 J. B. Fenton, 1305 N. Jefferson St., Springfield, Mo.
 L. T. Hagglund, Huntington, N. Y.
 E. C. Hodgkiss, 44 Myrtle Ave., Bloomfield, N. J.
 H. W. Horn, 459 62nd St., Brooklyn, N. Y.
 J. B. Howard, Mount Pleasant. Tenn.
 R. C. Jepson, 185 N. Laman Ave., Chicago, Ill.
 J. R. Jeter, Santuc, S. C.
 G. R. Johnson, 5958 W. Lake St., Chicago, Ill.
 M. W. Jones (Killed), Florence, S. C.
 J. B. Kless, 2289 Seneca St., Buffalo, N. Y.
 J. W. Lenoir, Rembert, S. C.
 J. D. McCullough, Greenville, S. C.
 R. W. Maxey, Memphis, Tenn.
 W. R. Menshon, New Brunswick, N. J.
 A. B. O'Neal, Gastonia, N. C.
 C. T. Parker, 815 Beacon St., Boston, Mass.
 T. C. Perrin, 27 Clinton Ave., S. Rochester, N. Y.
 J. W. Phillips, Chester, S. C.
 A. M. Pickett, 901 Jackson St., Durham, N. C.
 C. T. Prause, Charleston, S. C.
 W. F. Quinlivan, 215 N. 2nd St., Wilmington, N. C.
 C. R. Rehrig (Killed).
 G. E. Rossow.
 J. L. Seidler, 108 S. 12th St., Oleau, N. Y.
 H. M. Simpson, 225 High St., Geneva, N. Y.
 D. T. Smith, Abbeville, S. C.
 Tillman H. Smith (Killed), Cookville, Tenn.
 C. M. Slack.
 W. O. Stevenson (Killed), Abbeville, S. C.
 B. A. Sullivan, Laurens, S. C.
 F. C. Swanson, Hayesville, N. C.
 C. S. Tiers, 53 W. Walnut Lane, Philadelphia, Pa.
 Z. B. Thornburg, Concord, N. C.
 F. W. Witzke, 188 Niagara St., Tonawanda, N. Y.

